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ABSTRACT
Every recent presidential administration has faced an infectious disease
threat, and this trend is certain to continue. The states have primary respon-
sibility for protecting the public’s health under their police powers, but
modern travel makes diseases almost impossible to contain intrastate. How
should the federal government respond in the future? The Ebola scare in
the U.S. repeated a typical response—demands for quarantine. In January
2017, the Department of Health and Human Services and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention issued final regulations on its authority to
issue Federal Quarantine Orders. These regulations rely heavily on confin-
ing persons who may or may not be ill, raising serious questions about
federal commitment to due process protections as well as the scope of statu-
tory authority to impose quarantine. As the Supreme Court has stated in
United States v. Salerno, “liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial
or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” Unconstrained use of
quarantines undermines both the rule of law and public confidence in gov-
ernment decisions in times of crisis. This article analyzes the regulations
and argues for a rights-based approach to infectious disease control that
also protects public health. By respecting constitutional rights, the federal
government can encourage public trust and cooperation and minimize
harm, both essential requirements for controlling an epidemic.
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I. INTRODUCTION
EVERY recent United States federal administration has faced areal or potential epidemic, from Reagan and HIV to Obama andEbola.1 Future administrations will likely be no different. With
tourism and exploration expanding into forests, jungles, and caves, the
next pandemic could be sparked by an unsuspecting tourist visiting parts
of the world that humans have rarely seen.2 For example, a recent explo-
ration in Borneo revealed forty-eight new viruses in a cave and surround-
ing forest.3 Whether any of these can infect humans is unknown, but
some experts suggest it is only a matter of time before an ecotourist hot-
spot spawns the next global pandemic.4 Outbreaks of SARS, measles,
Ebola, and Zika confirm that infectious diseases are undeterred by bor-
ders.5 Does the United States have the legal framework to prevent or
respond to the next crisis?
Attention to pandemics and emergency preparedness tends to wax and
wane in direct proportion to the temporal proximity and visibility of a
threat.6 The immediate response is often to identify and remove likely
sources of harm, with interest in building protective infrastructure declin-
1. Anthony Fauci, Dir., Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases at the Nat’l Inst.
of Health, From AIDS to Zika: The Perpetual Challenge of Emerging Infectious Diseases,
Keynote Address at Northeastern University School of Law’s Symposium: Between Com-
placency and Panic: Legal, Ethical, and Policy Responses to Emerging Infectious Diseases
(Apr. 14, 2017), slides available at http://www.northeastern.edu/law/pdfs/academics/health-
law/conf17-presentations/fauci-keynote.pdf [https://perma.cc/DCQ7-C6H8]. In his address,
Dr. Fauci described some of the most significant diseases that each administration had to
tackle: Ronald Reagan and HIV/AIDS; George H.W. Bush and HIV/AIDS; Bill Clinton
and HIV/AIDS, West Nile Virus, H5N1 Influenza, and Antimicrobial Resistance; George
W. Bush and HIV/AIDS, Anthrax, H5N1 Influenza, and SARS; and Barack Obama and
H1N1 Influenza, MERS, Chikungunya, Ebola, Zika, and Antimicrobial Resistance. Id.
2. Michaeleen Doucleff & Jane Greenhalgh, The Next Pandemic Could Be Dripping





5. Former CDC Director Dr. Thomas Frieden has been quoted as saying “[W]e live
in a world where we are all connected by the air we breathe, the water we drink, the food
we eat, and by airplanes that can bring disease from anywhere to anywhere in a day.” Jane
Jordan et al., Legal, Operational, and Practical Considerations for Hospitals and Health
Care Providers in Responding to Communicable Diseases Following the 2014 Ebola Out-
break, 23 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 341, 344 (2015). For information on the recent Ebola
epidemic, see generally, WORLD HEALTH ORG., Ebola Outbreak 2014–2015, http://
www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/en/ [https://perma.cc/SCZ9-2ZAF].
6. Wendy E. Parmet, After September 11: Rethinking Public Health Federalism, 30 J.
L. MED. & ETHICS 201, 208 (2002). See also Peter Sands, et al., From Panic and Neglect to
Investing in Health Security: Financing Pandemic Preparedness at a National Level, iv (Int’l
Working Grp. on Financing Preparedness, Working Paper No. 115271, 2017), documents.
worldbank.org/curated/en/979591495652724770/pdf/115271-REVISED-IWG-Report-Con-
ference-Edition-5-25-2017-1-1-optimized-low.pdf [https://perma.cc/FK3K-2RT7] (“[A]s the
havoc caused by the last outbreak turns into a fading memory, we become complacent and
relegate the case for investing in preparedness on a back burner, only to bring it to the
forefront when the next outbreak occurs.”).
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ing as memories of the crisis fade.7 For example, after the 9/11 attacks,
including the subsequent anthrax attacks, Congress enacted several mea-
sures to identify and punish terrorists.8 However, the country has yet to
adopt many of the longer-term preventive measures recommended by the
9/11 Commission.9 More recently, and despite the small number of cases
in the United States, the Ebola scare created fear and even panic.10 Here
again, the predominant impulse of many officials and much of the public
was to isolate anyone who had been in an area where Ebola was present,
largely ignoring constitutional rights and public health principles.11 Will
this approach remain the default, or should a different conception of pre-
vention govern disease outbreaks?
The current administration has at its disposal a parting gift from the
Obama administration: new federal quarantine regulations.12 On January
19, 2017, the day before the inauguration of President Trump, the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS), with its Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), promulgated final rules amending the
regulations governing domestic and foreign quarantine. Though the terms
7. See Wendy K. Mariner, Beyond Lifestyle: Governing the Social Determinants of
Health, 42 AM. J. L. & MED. 284, 306 (2016) (noting that infectious disease control “typi-
cally takes the form of forbidding entry to anyone suspected of harboring infection and
rooting out potentially infected residents”).
8. See, e.g., HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC
INFLUENZA IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 226 (2006), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-re-
sources/pdf/pandemic-influenza-implementation.pdf [https://perma.cc/2R8X-HWXP]; see
also Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 331 (2007); John Warner National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083, 2404 (2006), repealed by National
Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3, 325–26.
9. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMIS-
SION REPORT 385, 387 (2004), https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J39K-T7UZ]; see also NAT’L SEC. PREPAREDNESS GRP., TENTH ANNI-
VERSARY REPORT CARD: THE STATUS OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS
(Sept. 2011), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/Commis-
sionRecommendations.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM2U-8NEZ].
10. Four cases of Ebola were diagnosed in the United States: Thomas Duncan, who
had visited Liberia, died of the disease; two nurses who cared for Duncan became infected
and recovered; and Dr. Craig Spencer, a physican who had treated Ebola patients in West
Africa and also recovered. Seven others (including six health care workers) who became
infected overseas were evacuated to the U.S. for treatment, six of whom recovered. Beth P.
Bell et al., CDC’s Response to the 2014-2016 Ebola Epidemic – West Africa and United
States, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 4, 9–10 (2016).
11. See, e.g., infra note 240 and accompanying text (describing the restrictive quaran-
tine orders utilized in New York and New Jersey); see also Michael R. Ulrich, Law and
Politics, An Emerging Epidemic: A Call for Evidence-Based Public Health Law, 42 AM. J.
L. & MED. 256, 259 (2016) (finding that the lack of scientific justification for quarantine
decisions during the Ebola scare raised public health and constitutional concerns). See gen-
erally Joseph Barbera et al., Large-Scale Quarantine Following Biological Terrorism in the
United States, Scientific Examination, Logistic and Legal Limits, and Possible Conse-
quences, 286 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 2711, 2711 (2001) (noting the inclination of officials to
resort to quarantine to contain the spread of disease, despite lack of effectiveness); Thomas
V. Inglesby, Rita Grossman & Tara O’Toole, A Plague on Your City: Observations from
TOPOFF, 32 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASE 436, 442 (2001) (“[R]ecommendations for
quarantine were made without sufficient consideration of the wide variety of
ramifications.”).
12. Control of Communicable Diseases, 82 Fed. Reg. 6890 (Jan. 19, 2017) (codified at
42 C.F.R. pts. 70, 71) [hereinafter Quarantine Regulations].
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quarantine and isolation are often used interchangeably, they are distinct
concepts. Isolation refers to the confinement of individuals known to be
infected with a contagious infection during its period of communicability,
whereas quarantine restricts the movements of persons who have been
exposed or potentially exposed to a contagious disease during the period
of its communicability.13
In the Federal Register, HHS/CDC stated they were issuing the 2017
rules to “clarify[ ] HHS/CDC’s response capabilities, practices, and
mak[e] them more transparent.”14 It also stated that “these measures,
which are largely current practice, are being published and codified to
make the public aware of their use.”15 It is unusual for a federal agency to
pursue formal rulemaking for the purpose of letting the public know what
it is already doing. An additional purpose offered in the Federal Register
was that these regulations were needed to respond to recent issues with
Ebola and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), both of which
are quarantinable communicable diseases within federal jurisdiction, and
repeated outbreaks of measles, which, notably, is not a federally quaran-
tinable communicable disease.16
In reality, these regulations appear to be a direct response to criticism
of the CDC during the 2014 Ebola scare. Much of the public blamed the
CDC for failing to prevent any Ebola case from arising within U.S. bor-
13. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 429 (2d
ed. 2008) [hereinafter GOSTIN, POWER]. “[I]solation is the separation, for the period of
communicability, of known infected persons in such places and under such conditions as to
prevent or limit the transmission of the infectious agent.” Id. (emphasis in original).
“[Q]uarantine is the restriction of the movement of persons who have been exposed, or
potentially exposed, to infectious disease, during its period of communicability, to prevent
transmission of infection during the incubation period.” Id. See also U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., What Is the Difference Between Isolation and Quarantine?,
https://www.hhs.gov/answers/public-health-and-safety/what-is-the-difference-between-iso-
lation-and-quarantine/index.html [https://perma.cc/Y77V-KVHR], (last visited Jan. 20,
2018). In practice, the term quarantine is often used to describe both, though quarantine is
a more controversial infringement on liberty rights given that the individual being detained
is not known to be infected.
14. Quarantine Regulations, supra note 12, at 6892.
15. Quarantine Regulations, supra note 12, at 6894, 6896.
16. Quarantine Regulations, supra note 12, at 6890. Federally quarantinable communi-
cable diseases are specified by Executive Order of the President. Public Health Service
Act, § 361, 42 U.S.C. § 264(b) (2012). Current quarantinable diseases are listed in Exec.
Ord. No. 13,674, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,671 (July 31, 2014) and previous versions: “(a) Cholera;
Diphtheria; infectious Tuberculosis; Plague; Smallpox; Yellow Fever; and Viral Hemor-
rhagic Fevers (Lassa, Marburg, Ebola, Crimean-Congo, South American, and others not
yet isolated or named).” Exec. Ord. No. 13,295, 68 Fed. Reg. 17,255 (Apr. 4, 2003), as
amended by Exec. Ord. 13,375, 70 Fed. Reg. 17,299 (Apr. 1, 2005), as amended by Exec.
Ord. No. 13,674, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,671 (July 31, 2014). “(b) Severe acute respiratory syn-
dromes, which are diseases that are associated with fever and signs and symptoms of pneu-
monia or other respiratory illness, are capable of being transmitted from person to person,
and that either are causing, or have the potential to cause, a pandemic, or, upon infection,
are highly likely to cause mortality or serious morbidity if not properly controlled. This
subsection does not apply to influenza.” Exec. Ord. No. 13,674, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,671 (July
31, 2014). “(c) Influenza caused by novel or reemergent influenza viruses that are causing,
or have the potential to cause, a pandemic.” Exec. Ord. No. 13,375, Fed. Reg. 17,299 (Apr.
1, 2005), as amended by Exec. Ord. No. 13,674, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,671 (July 31, 2014).
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ders.17 The CDC did issue guidelines for quarantine,18 but it has no legal
authority to require states to implement them, and many states ignored
the guidelines, using their own, often more restrictive and inconsistent
measures.19 The backlash against the CDC came in spite of the fact that
the agency is typically charged not with delivering services, but with data
collection and providing technical assistance, research, and laboratory
services to the states.20
The new regulations grant broad quarantine authority to the CDC.
They empower the CDC Director to authorize the “apprehension, medi-
cal examination, quarantine, isolation, or conditional release of any indi-
vidual for the purpose of preventing the introduction, transmission, and
spread of quarantinable communicable diseases, as specified by Execu-
tive Order.”21 This applies to those who arrive in the United States, those
who may move interstate, and to some whose movements remain intra-
state.22 Two observers suggested the new regulations may enable the
CDC to take a larger, more visible role during outbreaks.23
Several aspects of the regulations provoked concern over the adequacy
of due process protections for persons taken into custody, as well as the
17. James G. Hodge, Jr., Legal Myths of Ebola Preparedness and Response, 29 NOTRE
DAME J. L. ETHICS, & PUB. POL’Y 355, 364–65 (2015).
18. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, INTERIM U.S. GUIDANCE FOR
MONITORING AND MOVEMENT OF PERSONS WITH POTENTIAL EBOLA VIRUS EXPOSURE
(Oct. 27, 2014), https://www.mainequalitycounts.org/image_upload/Interim_Guidance_
CDC_10-27-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/22U6-TDLX].
19. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION & YALE GLOB. HEALTH JUSTICE P’SHIP., FEAR,
POLITICS, AND EBOLA: HOW QUARANTINES HURT THE FIGHT AGAINST EBOLA AND VIO-
LATE THE CONSTITUTION 26 (2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/
aclu-ebolareport.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RWL-U6NE] [hereinafter ACLU & GHJP]
(“[N]early half the country (at least 23 states) had announced quarantine and movement
restriction policies that exceeded the CDC’s guidelines.”). Some states even referenced the
CDC’s guidelines specifically when justifying their stricter approaches. Governor Malloy of
Connecticut stated: “I believe we must go above and beyond what the CDC is recom-
mending.” Id. at 25. New Jersey Governor Chris Christie stated that he believed the CDC
would “eventually . . . come around to our point of view on this.” Id.
20. Mark A. Rothstein, Ebola, Quarantine, and the Law, HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5, 5
(2015). The primary responsibility for local disease control lies with the states, which retain
police power to protect the public’s health. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–25
(1905). Yet, most state public health departments lack the expertise in epidemiology and
disease management for Ebola. ACLU & GHJP, supra note 19, at 25.
21. 42 C.F.R. § 70.6(a) (2017). The regulations include several other provisions that
are beyond the scope of this article. For example, the pilot of an interstate flight must
report “the occurrence onboard of any deaths or the presence of ill persons . . . and take
such measures as the Director may direct to prevent the potential spread of the communi-
cable disease.” Id. § 70.11(a). For flights and ships arriving from outside of U.S. borders,
the regulations list specifications for information that must be provided to the Director for
passengers and crew that the Director deems may be at risk of exposure to a communica-
ble disease. Id. § 71.4–71.5. The Director is also authorized under the regulations to con-
duct non-invasive public health prevention measures at ports of entry or other locations,
and may require individuals to provide certain information, such as contact information,
intended destination, health status, exposure history, and travel history. Id. § 71.20.
22. Id. § 70.5.
23. Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Reforming Federal Public Health Powers:
Responding to National and Global Threats, 317 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 1211, 1212 (2017)
(“Although the rule stresses cooperation with tribal, state, and local authorities, federal
agents can now intervene directly.”).
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limited provisions for their care.24 Others wondered whether they are
likely to be relevant in more than a handful of individual cases, thus pro-
viding little in terms of public protection.25 Still others questioned
whether they respond to the actual needs of a population facing the risk
of a disease outbreak.26 No one disputes the need to protect the popula-
tion from the spread of dangerous communicable diseases. The question
is whether these regulations offer the protection they appear to promise
or whether a different approach would be more effective.
In Part II of this paper we examine whether the regulations pass legal
muster. A threshold issue is whether the 2017 regulations are consistent
with the scope of statutory authority for the CDC. We then address the
heart of the issue: whether the regulations meet the substantive and pro-
cedural due process standards for involuntary quarantine and isolation.
In order to involuntarily confine an individual, both the characteristics of
the disease and the characteristics of the individual must be taken into
account. Only by examining both factors can an accurate assessment be
made as to whether the individual poses a risk to the public health war-
ranting involuntary confinement.
Part III asks whether the CDC should reconsider these regulations.
Despite the claim that they largely codify existing practice, these regula-
tions appear to be a reaction to the Ebola scare rather than a thoughtful,
scientific, or principled approach to preventing a variety of epidemics.
This part compares the regulations’ reliance on quarantine with alterna-
tive measures that would better prevent transmitting contagious diseases,
such as providing evidence-based information and support to encourage
voluntary cooperation. History teaches that in the modern era, quaran-
tine has rarely prevented an epidemic, is often impossible to implement
on a wide scale, and has often been applied in a discriminatory manner.
We conclude that the 2017 regulations are unlikely to improve public
health outcomes and may in fact exacerbate harms.
Finally, Part IV examines the federal role in preventing disease trans-
mission more generally. An ad hoc state approach is unlikely to contain
the spread of disease. In the absence of credible medical information,
states are likely to make alpha and beta errors, missing those who are
infected and imposing unnecessary restrictions on those who are not.
More importantly, they may miss opportunities to take the steps that
24. The NPRM of August 15, 2016 received 15,800 comments. Quarantine Regulations,
supra note 12, at 6894; see Quarantine Regulations, supra note 12, at 6916 (discussing due
process concerns); Quarantine Regulations, supra note 12, at 6918 (discussing issues with
payment for care and treatment).
25. See, e.g., Quarantine Regulations, supra note 12, at 6924 (regarding public com-
ments that state and local regulations are sufficient to protect the public).
26. See, e.g., Quarantine Regulations, supra note 12, at 6896 (suggesting that education
on health practices would be more effective than the promulgated regulations); see also
Kyle Edwards, Wendy Parmet & Scott Burris, Opinion and Editorial, Why the C.D.C.’s
Power to Quarantine Should Worry Us, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/01/23/opinion/why-the-cdcs-power-to-quarantine-should-worry-us.html
[https://perma.cc/RE6S-LZU5] (questioning the practicality of the regulations).
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would better protect the population. We conclude that the federal gov-
ernment should look beyond quarantine, with its focus on quasi-criminal
enforcement, and develop the positive measures needed to protect the
public health. A rights-based approach to our next epidemic, one relying
on transparency and science-based measures, will ensure that federal law
becomes an asset to public health rather than a liablity.
II. POWER AND RIGHTS: THE LEGALITY OF THE FEDERAL
QUARANTINE REGULATIONS
Federal authority to quarantine ships, commodities, and people has
rarely been challenged, but its use has often been controversial. Our past
is replete with examples of the discriminatory use of quarantine, typically
targeting immigrants, the poor, minorities, and marginalized groups.27
During the Bubonic plague at the beginning of the twentieth century,
public health officers tried to quarantine and inoculate only those of Chi-
nese descent, on the theory that they were especially susceptible to
plague, ignoring the actual source of infection—fleas carried by rats.28 A
federal court found that the San Francisco quarantine ordinance violated
the Equal Protection Clause.29 There was no evidence to support the
city’s rationale that Asians were especially susceptible to plague. In a sec-
ond case, the same court also found the quarantine was “not a reasonable
regulation to accomplish the purposes sought.”30 The quarantined area
included both people who were infected and those who were not, increas-
ing—not decreasing—the probability of disease transmission.
Thus, while both state and federal governments have (different) au-
thority to pass laws imposing quarantine when necessary to contain a con-
tagious disease outbreak, the more salient question is how those laws are
implemented.31 Ideally, regulations implementing the power to quaran-
tine should avoid the mistakes of the past. Regulations granting discre-
tion to officials in determining the need for quarantine do not guarantee
27. See Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine,
14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 66 (1985) [hereinafter Parmet, AIDS] (discussing how health offi-
cials used quarantine against prostitutes as a complement to police work). See generally
HOWARD MARKEL, QUARANTINE! (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1997).
28. Wendy K. Mariner, George J. Annas & Wendy E. Parmet, Pandemic Preparedness:
A Return to the Rule of Law, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 341, 354–55 (2009). See generally
MARILYN CHASE, THE BARBARY PLAGUE: THE BLACK DEATH IN VICTORIAN SAN FRAN-
CISCO (2003).
29. Wong Wai v. Williamson, 103 F. 1, 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900).
30. Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 23–24 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) (“Though the law
itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and
illegal discriminations, between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights,
the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.”).
31. The primary responsibility for local disease control lies with the states, which re-
tain police power to protect the public’s health, safety and welfare. Federal authority is
grounded primarily in the power to regulate commerce. Compagnie Francaise de Naviga-
tion a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 389 (1902). See WENDY E. PARMET,
POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW (2009); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 296
(1824).
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misuse. At the same time, flexibility in enforcement can invite the abuse
of power. Indeed, constitutional due process and equal protection safe-
guards are mandated for this very reason.
A. STATUTORY AUTHORITY
The federal statutory authority to promulgate the 2017 federal quaran-
tine regulations derives from Section 361 of the Public Health Service
Act, codified at § 264 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code, which grants the Secre-
tary of HHS authority to “make and enforce such regulations as in [their]
judgment are necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or
spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States
or possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State or
possession.”32 Regulations may not provide for the apprehension, deten-
tion, or conditional release of individuals except for the purpose of
preventing the introduction, transmission, or spread of the diseases speci-
fied in Executive Orders of the President (the “quarantinable dis-
eases”).33 Individuals who have a disease that is not listed in the
Executive Order are not subject to apprehension or detention under this
federal law.
The statute treats foreign and interstate travelers differently. Section
264(c) of the statute requires that regulations that provide for the appre-
hension, detention, examination, or conditional release of an individual
can only apply to individuals who are coming into the United States from
a foreign country or possession.34 Subsection 264(d) creates a limited ex-
ception to the foreign arrival requirement. This exception provides the
jurisdictional authorization for interstate quarantine measures:
(d) Apprehension and examination of persons reasonably believed
to be infected.
(1) Regulations prescribed under this section may provide for the
apprehension and examination of any individual reasonably be-
lieved to be infected with a communicable disease in a qualifying
stage and (A) to be moving or about to move from a State to an-
other State; or (B) to be a probable source of infection to individu-
als who, while infected with such disease in a qualifying stage, will
32. 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (2012). Though 42 U.S.C. § 264 and § 265 grant authority to the
Surgeon General, the Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1966 abolished the Office of the Sur-
geon General and transferred the functions of the Surgeon General to the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare, which was later redesignated the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, and retained the authorities under 42 U.S.C. § 264 and § 265 despite the
Office of the Surgeon General being reestablished in 1987. Control of Communicable Dis-
eases, 81 Fed. Reg. 54,230, at 54,232 (Aug. 15, 2016) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 70, 71
(2017)).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 264(b). For a list of current quarantinable communicable diseases, see
supra note 16.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 264(c) (“Application of regulations to persons entering from foreign
countries. Except as provided in subsection (d), regulations prescribed under this section,
insofar as they provide for the apprehension, detention, examination, or conditional re-
lease of individuals, shall be applicable only to individuals coming into a State or posses-
sion from a foreign country or a possession.”).
400 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
be moving from a State to another State. Such regulations may
provide that if upon examination any such individual is found to be
infected, he may be detained for such time and in such manner as
may be reasonably necessary.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term “qualifying stage”,
with respect to a communicable disease, means that such disease—
(A) is in a communicable stage; or
(B) is in a precommunicable stage, if the disease would be likely to
cause a public health emergency if transmitted to other
individuals.35
Here, the statute clearly authorizes only the apprehension and examina-
tion of someone reasonably believed to be infected and moving across
state lines.36 The statute does not authorize the detention of anyone al-
ready in the United States unless and until that person is found to actu-
ally be infected with a quarantinable disease.37 Therefore, there is no
statutory authority for federal interstate quarantine—only federal inter-
state isolation of infected persons. There is some pragmatic logic to this.
Given the states’ resources and experience with domestic quarantine, it is
likely that, in practice, the CDC would rely on the states to execute inter-
state quarantines.
Contrary to this statute, the 2017 interstate regulations provide for in-
definite detention of individuals within the United States without any
finding that the individual is infected with a quarantinable disease.38 Un-
like the statute, the text of the interstate regulations for domestic quaran-
tine mirrors the text for foreign arrivals (foreign regulations). Thus, on its
face, this interstate quarantine regulation constitutes administrative
agency action beyond the scope of its statutory authority and is, there-
fore, invalid. Where the statute is clear about an agency’s regulatory au-
thority, the agency has no power to act on matters outside the scope of
that authority.39
One potential defense of the interstate regulations providing for deten-
tion might be that the statutory term “apprehension” is sufficiently am-
biguous, within the meaning of Chevron,40 to permit the agency to
35. Id. at § 264(d) (emphasis added).
36. See infra notes 43–47 and accompanying text (distinguishing between apprehen-
sion and detention in terms of length of time).
37. The actual infection limitation requirement may be intended to restrict federal
jurisdiction to cases in which an individual poses an actual threat to interstate commerce.
The subsection also requires meeting a second criterion—(A) that the person is or will be
traveling from State to State or (B) likely to infect someone else who will be traveling
across state lines. 42 U.S.C. § 264(d).
38. 42 C.F.R. § 70.6 (2017).
39. Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937 (1986) (“an agency’s power is no greater than that
delegated to it by Congress”); La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986)
(same); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Massachu-
setts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007) (“The statutory text forecloses EPA’s reading.”).
40. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)
(Where Congress has not “directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” the court may
defer to the agency’s interpretation as long as it is “based on a permissible construction of
the statute.”).
2018] Quarantine 401
interpret it broadly—to include the detention specified in the interstate
regulations before determining whether a person is actually infected with
a quarantinable disease. There are several problems with this argument,
however. First, Congress did speak directly to the issue in question.41 The
statute uses the terms apprehension and detention separately in both the
foreign section (§ 264(c)) and the interstate section (§ 264(d)), making it
difficult to assume that apprehension means one thing in (c) and some-
thing different in (d). Second, the agencies’ explanation in the Federal
Register makes no reference to ambiguous terms, to Chevron, or to how
the agency interprets the term “apprehension.”42 It offers no reason why
the rule goes beyond the statute.
A third problem with the agency’s interpretation is that it is a stretch to
assume that apprehension in the statute includes many days of deten-
tion.43 The regulations appear to use apprehension and detention consist-
ently with the statute, with apprehension meaning the initial stopping of a
person for questioning, and detention meaning involuntary confine-
ment.44 Both the statute and the foreign and interstate rules allow appre-
hension on the basis of a reasonable belief that a person is infected,
perhaps analogous to a Terry stop.45 In the statute, however, a person
already in the country cannot be detained, perhaps analogous to arrest,
unless that domestic person is found to be infected.46 This analogy sup-
ports the distinction between the two, in that apprehension should be a
relatively short amount of time and with the specific purpose of acquiring
information to determine whether a longer restriction, a detention, is law-
ful. Thus, the agency’s application of the same procedures in foreign and
domestic cases is hard to justify as a permissible interpretation of the
terms of the statute.47
41. Id. at 842 (A court must first ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue.”).
42. See Control of Communicable Diseases, 81 Fed. Reg. 54,230 (Aug. 15, 2016) (codi-
fied at 42 C.F.R. pts. 70, 71).
43. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 U.S. 2699, 2707 (2015) (“agencies must operate within
the bounds of reasonable interpretation” (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S.
Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014))).
44. This usage differs from that in criminal law. Criminal laws distinguish between
apprehending and detaining people, with apprehension sometimes used as a synonym for
the initial seizure, capture, or arrest of a suspect. Arrests require probable cause. Deten-
tion is typically limited to temporarily and briefly stopping someone, usually in a public
place where the person remains free to leave (usually after answering some benign ques-
tions); it does not typically force the person to move to a different location. “Terry” stops
require reasonable suspicion. In criminal law, a temporary detention that lasts a long time
can be deemed to be an arrest subject to Fourth Amendment requirements. See Wayne R.
LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough
Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1850, 1898–99 (2004) (describing a Terry stop
as temporary and brief in nature, and methods officers utilize to avoid violating the Fourth
Amendment with overly extended stops).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 264(d)(1) (2012).
46. Id.
47. It is not clear why Congress established two different sets of permissible measures
for foreign and interstate quarantine in the first place. One possibility might be that Con-
gress assumed that persons arriving at the nation’s borders would be more likely to bring a
Quarantinable Disease into the country undiscovered than would people traveling inside
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The statutory authorization of regulations that provide for examination
of the person (both foreign and domestic) complicates the issue. It might
take time to examine the person who has been apprehended in order to
determine whether the person is in fact infected. If “examination” is lim-
ited to a brief interview, relevant information may take only minutes to
collect. If diagnostic tests are desired, however, results may take several
days. Perhaps the agency decided that the time period for apprehension
should include this time. But, restricting the person’s movement or re-
moving the person to a place he or she cannot leave is an obvious limita-
tion on liberty—a detention.48 This may be justifiable—or at least
lawful—in the case of persons entering the country, given the quite lim-
ited constitutional protections for foreign arrivals and border searches.49
When detaining domestic persons already lawfully in the country, how-
ever, the agency is not only acting beyond its prescribed authority, but
may also violate both the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreason-
able searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against
infringing liberty.50 Moreover, the regulations themselves (both foreign
and interstate) appropriately do not require the person to submit to any
bodily intrusion, such as a blood draw. Therefore, as a practical matter,
under the regulations, a domestic person who has not been found to be
infected could be detained and the liberty violation could last many days,
even weeks, which is hard to justify as a simple process to stop and in-
quire.51 Even if the statute were ambiguous, an agency interpretation that
raises a constitutional issue would be inconsistent with the interpretive
rule of avoiding constitutional problems.52
the country. The statute was originally enacted in 1944, in wartime and before leisure and
business travel was widespread. Public Health Services Act, Pub. L. No. 78–410, § 361, 58
Stat. 703–04 (1944). Amendments to the text have not altered its substance, except to sub-
stitute “in a qualifying stage” for “communicable disease.” See supra note 35 and accompa-
nying text.
48. See discussion infra Part II.B.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (upholding a seventy-two-
hour detention of a suspected drug mule at the border).
50. See discussion infra Part II.B. While unnecessary detention can be a violation of
the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unwarranted seizures, this article does not
focus on these arguments as they have rarely been raised in this context.
51. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (“The weight [accorded to
an administrative] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evi-
dent in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade . . . . “ (quoting
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))).
52. See infra notes 266–269 and accompanying text. There is a second inconsistency
between the statute and regulations that is worth noting. The statute provides for penalties
of “a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or
both” for any violation of the statute or regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). The regula-
tions, however, specify a fine of up to $100,000—a tenfold increase ($250,000 if the viola-
tion results in death). 42 C.F.R. §§ 70.2, 70.18 (2017). Fines for organizations are up to
$200,000 and $500,000 respectively. Id. It appears that this increase resulted from compar-
ing prison sentences in the United States criminal code with their corresponding fines.
Section 3571 of the criminal code allows the imposition of fines on defendants who have
been found guilty of an offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2012). 18 U.S.C. § 3571 provides:
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B. PROTECTING LIBERTY
“[I]nvoluntary confinement of an individual for any reason, is a dep-
rivation of liberty which the State cannot accomplish without due
process of law.”53
There is no question that the state has the authority to take measures
to protect the public’s health by exercising its police powers.54 However,
these powers are not unbounded. The individual’s right to liberty, pro-
tected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, constrains the govern-
ment’s options. Both involuntary quarantine and isolation are obvious
deprivations of liberty, which require justification. With respect to infec-
tious diseases, the actions needed to prevent transmission depend on the
characteristics of the pathogen (e.g., virulence, mode of transmission,
probability of infection given exposure, probability of illness given infec-
tion, incubation period, appearance of symptoms) and the availability of
control measures (e.g., accurate and reliable diagnostic tests, safe and ef-
(a) In general.—A defendant who has been found guilty of an offense may
be sentenced to pay a fine.
(b) Fines for individuals.—Except as provided in subsection (e) of this sec-
tion, an individual who has been found guilty of an offense may be fined not
more than the greatest of—
(1) the amount specified in the law setting forth the offense;
(2) the applicable amount under subsection (d) of this section;
(3) for a felony, not more than $250,000;
(4) for a misdemeanor resulting in death, not more than $250,000;
(5) for a Class A misdemeanor that does not result in death, not more than
$100,000;
(6) for a Class B or C misdemeanor that does not result in death, not more
than $5,000; or
(7) for an infraction, not more than $5,000.
(d) . . .
(e) Special rule for lower fine specified in substantive provision.—If a law
setting forth an offense specifies no fine or a fine that is lower than the fine
otherwise applicable under this section and such law, by specific reference,
exempts the offense from the applicability of the fine otherwise applicable
under this section, the defendant may not be fined more than the amount
specified in the law setting forth the offense.
Id. at § 3571(a)–(b), (e). These criminal fines may not be more than the fine specified in
the law describing the offense (here $1,000) unless the offender has been convicted of an
infraction, misdemeanor or felony. Id. § 3571(b). HHS appears to have characterized the
offense as a Class A misdemeanor, because it carries a maximum prison sentence of one
year, and concluded that a Class A misdemeanor could carry a fine of not more than
$100,000 under § 3571(b). 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (2012) (classification system for criminal of-
fenses and sentences). Even more troubling, though consistent with the penal tone of these
regulations, is the fact the penalties are applicable to any violation of a quarantine order,
which can apply to a person who is not even infected, further disconnecting these regula-
tions from health outcomes.
53. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580 (1975) (Burger, J., concurring) (empha-
sis added).
54. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (noting the “settled principle[ ]
[that] the police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regula-
tions established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the
public safety”). In the case of quarantine, state government authority comes from the po-
lice power, while federal authority derives from the Commerce Clause. See also GOSTIN,
POWER, supra note 13, at 5–6.
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fective vaccines or treatments, and isolation). These dictate what mea-
sures may be reasonable.
Quarantine or isolation may be a valid measure in appropriate circum-
stances. For example, a highly contagious airborne disease with a high
mortality rate could warrant a broader use of quarantine than Ebola,
which is not transmissible until after symptoms manifest. But, the rights
that an individual retains are not determined by the gravity of the out-
break alone. Rather, the gravity and circumstances of the outbreak, the
disease characteristics, the availability of control measures, and the char-
acteristics of the individual in question affect the strength of the govern-
ment’s justification for limiting a right. Due process protections exist to
ensure that individuals are not deprived of their liberty mistakenly or ar-
bitrarily. Consistent respect for rights is also critical in contagious disease
response, because public adherence to government control measures is
likely to depend on faith in the fairness of those measures. Substantive
due process is intended to ensure the government has sufficient justifica-
tion for limiting individual rights. Procedural due process offers the safe-
guards needed to ensure that laws are properly applied to those
individuals to whom the laws are supposed to apply.55 Even though the
state may be justified in invoking confinement measures during an out-
break, due process protections should ensure that these measures are ap-
plied only to those who pose a sufficient risk of spreading the disease to
necessitate the deprivation of liberty. Several provisions in the regula-
tions raise substantive due process questions; others raise procedural due
process questions.
1. Substantive Due Process
The term quarantine is often (mis)used to mean several different mea-
sures, all of which restrict liberty. Isolation properly refers to the confine-
ment of someone known to be infected, whereas quarantine refers to
confining an individual who has been exposed or potentially exposed to an
infectious disease during its period of communicability.56 Both involun-
tary quarantine and involuntary isolation are particularly extreme depri-
vations of liberty and should be used only when no other intervention is
able to minimize the risk of infection to the public.57In all cases, the goal,
of course, is to protect a healthy population from exposure to a harmful
contagion. Examples stretch from fourteenth century quarantines to pro-
tect the population from the Black Death to modern quarantines of
55. Parmet, AIDS, supra note 27, at 81.
56. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., What Is the Difference Between Isola-
tion and Quarantine?, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
57. Wendy E. Parmet, J.S. Mill and the American Law of Quarantine, 1 PUB. HEALTH
ETHICS 210, 213 (2008) [hereinafter Parmet, J.S. Mill]. Involuntary isolation is not neces-
sary for anyone who can take precautions to avoid exposing others to infection, assuming
the person is infected. Most courts and many state statutes require that a person be subject
to the least restrictive conditions that the individual’s particular circumstances permit. See,
e.g., Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
2018] Quarantine 405
cruise ships carrying passengers with a norovirus.58
Importantly, movement restrictions can be voluntary or involuntary.
Most people who are seriously ill with a contagious disease seek medical
treatment and voluntarily accept isolation, typically as a patient in a hos-
pital room, as part of their treatment.59 Voluntary isolation as part of
medical therapy is non-controversial; it poses no legal problems, even
though the purpose of isolation during treatment is to protect others from
exposure to a communicable infection.60 In contrast, an involuntary
movement restriction is a form of civil commitment imposed by govern-
ment and generally must comply with both substantive and procedural
due process requirements, as discussed below. The media and some gov-
ernment reports, however, often refer to these movement restrictions as
quarantines without distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary
cases.61 Analyses of laws governing either involuntary isolation or invol-
untary quarantine, however, should keep the distinctions in mind. In this
article, unless otherwise indicated, the use of the term quarantine refers
to involuntary movement restrictions, including isolation.
The 2017 regulations set forth rules for the involuntary detention of
individuals believed to be infected with a quarantinable communicable
disease.62 As noted above, the statute authorizes regulations providing
for the apprehension, detention, examination, and conditional release of
such individuals, but does not use the term quarantine.63 Thus, whether
these regulations comply with due process requirements depends on their
compliance with the due process required for involuntary civil detention.
While the United States Supreme Court has not heard a case involving
the involuntary quarantine or isolation of an individual to prevent the
spread of disease, it has set forth standards for the civil commitment of
persons who have been diagnosed as having a mental disorder to prevent
them from causing future harm to others. State courts have used these
standards in civil commitment doctrine by analogy to determine when
involuntary confinement is justified to prevent the spread of infectious
58. Wendy Ryan, Dirty Dining: 10 Florida Cruise Ships Hit with Norovirus in 2016 and
2017 Still Passed Inspections, ABC ACTION NEWS (May 22, 2017), https://www.abcaction
news.com/money/consumer/dirty-dining/dirty-dining-10-fl-cruise-ships-hit-with-norovirus-
this-last-year-and-still-passed-inspections [https://perma.cc/5XHC-GCND].
59. Mariner, supra note 28, at 357.
60. The legality presumes that the voluntary isolation is indeed voluntary. During the
Ebola scare in the U.S., there were reports of quarantine orders that were labeled volun-
tary that were accepted under coercion and, thus, were not truly voluntary, raising consti-
tutional concerns. See infra notes 116, 275–278 and accompanying text.
61. ACLU & GHJP, supra note 19, at 26; see Gostin, supra note 13 (describing the
difference between isolation and quarantine).
62. Quarantinable communicable diseases are those specified by Executive Order. 42
C.F.R. § 70.6(a) (2017); see supra note 16. Other sections of the regulations provide for
quarantine of vessels and commodities entering the United States. Id. § 71.5. Here we ad-
dress only the sections affecting individuals.
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2012). In the statute, the term quarantine is reserved for gen-
eral section headings and summarily characterizing “quarantine stations” and “quarantine
duties.” See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 267–68.
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disease.64
In its civil commitment cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
that the state has no cognizable interest in confining individuals who have
not committed any crime unless the individual, by reason of mental ill-
ness, is essentially unable to control his own dangerous behavior so that
he is likely to harm other people. In O’Connor v. Donaldson, the Court
declared that “[a] finding of ‘mental illness’ alone cannot justify a State’s
locking a person up against his will . . . .”65 Florida had committed Ken-
neth Donaldson to a mental institution for nearly fifteen years on the sole
ground that he was mentally ill. The Court rejected the hospital superin-
tendent’s argument that the state was within its authority to hold an indi-
vidual who was “sick,” even though he posed no risk of harm to anyone
at any time in his life, including during confinement.66
In Foucha v. Louisiana, the Court made clear that to hold an individual
involuntarily in civil commitment, the Due Process Clause required proof
of two elements: mental illness and dangerousness to themselves or
others.67 By itself, neither element provides sufficient justification for
confinement.68 Furthermore, the Court stated that the burden of proof
lies with the State to show that each element exists with “clear and con-
vincing evidence,” as a preponderance of the evidence “fell short of satis-
fying due process.”69 The Court recognized that a “loss of liberty
produced by an involuntary commitment is more than a loss of freedom
from confinement.”70 Therefore, “the Due Process Clause contains a sub-
stantive component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government ac-
tions ‘regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
them.’”71 It is for this reason that substantive due process “requires that
the nature of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose
for which the individual is committed.”72
Civil commitment is a form of preventive detention, a measure gener-
ally disfavored in the United States. Whereas, criminal confinement may
64. See e.g., City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265, 175–276 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1993) (anal-
ogizing civil commitment standards for mental illness to state that evidence must show the
individual has an illness and is a danger to others).
65. 422 U.S. 563, 573–75 (1975). The Court added, “[T]here is still no constitutional
basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live
safely in freedom.” Id.
66. Id. at 564, 568–70. After his release, Donaldson published a book describing his
experience. KENNETH DONALDSON, INSANITY INSIDE OUT (CROWN PUBLISHERS, 1976).
67. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75–76 (1992).
68. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (“A finding of dangerousness, stand-
ing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary
commitment. We have sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof
of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a ‘mental illness’ or
‘mental abnormality.’ These added statutory requirements serve to limit involuntary civil
confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous
beyond their control.”) (citations omitted).
69. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75–76.
70. Id. at 79.
71. Id. at 80.
72. Id. at 79.
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stem from voluntary criminal acts known to violate the law, an individ-
ual’s civil commitment may result through no fault of their own. The
Court has emphasized the difference between confinement as punish-
ment for criminal offenses and civil confinement for the protection of the
public: “That distinction is necessary lest ‘civil commitment’ become a
‘mechanism for retribution or general deterrence’—functions properly
those of criminal law, not civil commitment.”73 In theory, the criminal law
serves a deterrent function for people who are presumed to be rational
and capable of conforming their conduct to the law. Those who are not
deterred can be punished after committing a crime, not before.74 In con-
trast, a person who suffers from a mental illness that makes it difficult or
impossible to control his or her own actions cannot necessarily be de-
terred. Civil commitment is reserved for such cases in order to protect the
public from future harm that the person cannot help causing.
The principles in these cases provide the doctrinal structure for laws
authorizing involuntary civil commitment for individuals with a conta-
gious disease who are likely to spread it to others.75 The mere presence of
the contagious disease, like the mere presence of mental illness, does not
by itself constitute a likelihood of harming others. In both cases, the po-
tential harm comes from the person’s behavior. In the case of contagious
disease, the behavior may be deliberate or inadvertent—contact with
other people that could actually infect them.76 This is analogous to the
harm that could be inflicted by a person who cannot control behavior
because of a mental illness. It is for this reason that both elements—con-
tagious disease and actions that place other people at risk of harm—are
necessary to justify involuntary confinement. There is no reason—and no
73. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002).
74. For a fictional portrayal of a world where individuals are punished for crimes prior
to committing them, see MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox, DreamWorks Pictures
2002).
75. This article does not address the question of whether and to what extent the state
may civilly commit a person for harm to self, because that concern is not present in the
case of contagious disease, where the state’s primary purpose is to prevent the spread of
disease to others. While many states authorize civil commitment for mental illness and
harm to oneself as well as others, the Supreme Court has not elucidated the scope of state
power to protect mentally ill persons from harming themselves. See the dictum in
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (“That the State has a proper interest in
providing care and assistance to the unfortunate goes without saying. But the mere pres-
ence of mental illness does not disqualify a person from preferring his home to the com-
forts of an institution. Moreover, while the State may arguably confine a person to save
him from harm, incarceration is rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising the living
standards of those capable of surviving safely in freedom, on their own or with the help of
family or friends.”).
76. Deliberate infection of others is a rare event and could be prosecuted as a crime
like assault. Inadvertent transmission of disease may occur if the person is unaware of the
precautions that should be taken; lives in crowded surroundings, such as a homeless shelter
or on the street, where public contact is inevitable; or, as in most of the reported cases in
recent decades, suffers from a mental illness or substance use disorder that makes it diffi-
cult for them to adhere to the necessary precautions. See, e.g., City of Newark v. J.S., 652
A.2d 265, 277 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1993) (finding that the risk for spreading infection is in-
creased due to the individual being homeless, unable to shelter in place, and likely to stay
in a shelter where other homeless individuals would be at risk).
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constitutional justification—for confining people who are able to control
their behavior and avoid putting others at risk of being harmed. There-
fore, both the characteristics of the disease and the characteristics of the
individual must be examined to determine whether involuntary confine-
ment is warranted.
This civil commitment standard creates a simple two-factor test,77 mak-
ing clear that both the disease and the individual’s ability and willingness
to control their behavior are factors that must be considered. These two
factors weighed in tandem determine the potential risk to the public.
Moreover, evaluating each factor permits responses tailored to the de-
gree of risk to the public. It is not a binary choice between involuntarily
confining individuals in a government facility or letting them go free and
placing the public at risk. That is a false dichotomy. There is a wide spec-
trum of interventions, including active monitoring and being confined in
one’s home, that infringe to a lesser extent on individual liberty. The de-
gree of intrusion into individual liberty should match the degree of risk to
the public.
To be sure, there are some instances in which the severity of a particu-
lar contagious disease can justify quarantining a person before the pres-
ence of infection can be determined.78 The justification lies, in part, on
the particular pathology of the infectious agent, the ease of transmission
from person-to-person by casual contact, and a substantial probability of
serious illness or death resulting from infection. In such cases, the magni-
tude of the possible harm can outweigh the person’s liberty interest in not
being mischaracterized as having a deadly disease.
However, the pathology of the disease itself does not provide a basis
for ignoring the second factor of the test: evidence that the individual is
likely to behave in such a way that will transmit the infection to others
(assuming the person is in fact infected). The state has no reason to invol-
untarily quarantine a person who will not infect other people. A conta-
gious disease cannot be transmitted to others unless the presumably
infected person behaves in ways that could transmit infection. For seri-
ously dangerous airborne agents, it may be more difficult for an individ-
ual to ensure they can protect others. Transmission of blood-borne agents
would be easier to prevent since they require more intimate contact or at
least leaving blood-stained items, such as clothing, blankets, or needles,
where others could touch them. Thus, the second part of the two-factor
test should not be abandoned, even in plausible emergency
77. While the mental illness jurisprudence requires the presence of mental illness,
quarantine by definition does not require certainty of infection and, indeed, there may be
circumstances where involuntary quarantine for a contagious disease may be justified. Our
contention is that this may only be true in rare cases and that to determine when this action
is warranted requires proper examination of both the profile of the disease and the individ-
ual. See infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
78. A prompt hearing must follow to evaluate whether continued confinement is justi-




Dr. Craig Spencer and Nurse Kaci Hickox are examples of persons
who were suspected of harboring the Ebola virus, but could not be justifi-
ably quarantined, because neither the characteristics of the disease nor
the characteristics of the individuals supported involuntary confine-
ment.80 Ebola cannot be spread to others until after symptoms appear.
Furthermore, both individuals were experts in the disease with experi-
ence treating Ebola patients and, therefore, more than capable of avoid-
ing any behavior that might transmit any infection. They posed no threat
to the public. In contrast, a person who is suspected of infection with
active, contagious tuberculosis and who also suffers from a disabling con-
dition that makes it difficult to control his own behavior could meet both
factors for emergency involuntary detention for the purpose of determin-
ing whether he does in fact have the infection.81
Emergency quarantine seems relevant primarily to travelers entering
the United States from countries where quarantinable diseases exist. This
is because quarantine applies to persons who may have been exposed to
such a disease, but are not yet known to be infected. Furthermore, impos-
ing quarantine at the border is more clearly a matter of federal law.82
However, the CDC did not attempt or even recommend federal emer-
gency quarantine for either Dr. Spencer or Nurse Hickox when they re-
turned to the United States after treating Ebola patients overseas.
Instead, the state of New Jersey took Nurse Hickox into custody, and the
state of Maine attempted unsuccessfully to confine her to her home. Fed-
eral emergency quarantine orders have been and are likely to remain
very rare, which suggests that they offer negligible protection of the gen-
eral public in the event of a real epidemic.83
The 2017 quarantine regulations go well beyond the doctrinal frame-
work described above by authorizing involuntary confinement without
requiring consideration of both of the factors required for civil commit-
ment. The regulations do not require any evidence that a person is likely
to act in ways that will infect others. And, the regulations do not require
an examination into the characteristics of the disease, which, as described
79. See Myers v. Patterson, 819 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 2016) (stating that in order to
handcuff and briefly detain a person who is mentally ill, an officer must have probable
cause to believe that a person poses a danger to others or herself).
80. See Bell, supra note 10.
81. See, e.g., City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265, 274 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1993). Though
in this particular case the individual was known to be infected with tuberculosis and was
confined to prevent the spread of disease, to prevent the disease from becoming a resistant
strain, and to treat him if he wished to be treated.
82. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Siegel v. Shinnick, 219 F. Supp. 789, 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
83. The case of Andrew Speaker does not fit the emergency quarantine model, be-
cause the CDC knew that Mr. Speaker had tuberculosis (although the CDC misdiagnosed
his case as one of extensively resistant TB), and the CDC served him with a federal quar-
antine order only after he voluntarily admitted himself to a New York hospital. His case is
better characterized as isolation for treatment. Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs. Ctrs. For Disease Control & Prevention, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1360–61 (N.D. Ga.
2009), reversed, 623 F. 3d 1371 (11th Cir. 2017).
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earlier, is critical to establishing what the potential magnitude of harm is
to the public. Rather, a reasonable belief that an individual is infected
with a quarantinable disease is the sole standard used to justify involun-
tary commitment.84
In the foreign regulations, the CDC Director may “isolate, quarantine,
or place . . . under surveillance” any person arriving into the United
States whom “the Director has reason to believe . . . is infected with or
has been exposed to any of the communicable diseases listed in an Execu-
tive Order.”85 A case from 1963 demonstrates the problem with this stan-
dard. Ellen Siegel was held in quarantine for up to fourteen days because
she did not present a “valid certificate” of vaccination against small pox.86
Mrs. Siegel had visited Sweden when it still had a case of smallpox and
although she had been revaccinated about two months earlier, the vacci-
nation was said to be “unsuccessful.” The district court denied her peti-
tion for habeas corpus, even though officials had no evidence of Mrs.
Siegel’s exposure to small pox. On one hand, the judge clearly stated the
grounds for isolation: “[O]ne who is considered by the health authority
(medical officer in charge) as having been exposed to infection by a
quarantineable [sic] disease and to be capable of spreading that dis-
ease.”87 On the other hand, the judge allowed the medical officer consid-
erable discretion in believing that there was an opportunity for Mrs.
Siegel to have been exposed during her four days in Stockholm, since
there would be no way to know whether she had in fact been exposed
until the fourteen day incubation period elapsed, and also failed to con-
sider Mrs. Siegel’s ability to take appropriate precautions.88
The Siegel case demonstrates a disconnect between doctrine and prac-
tice, especially in the case of quarantine in the absence of evidence of
infection. It is not surprising that judges are wary of releasing individuals
who might have a communicable disease, contrary to the judgment of
health officials. However, as seen in this case, that judgment may have
had less to do with evidence of actual exposure or infection than with
making a safe decision for the public and the officials themselves. If offi-
cials are wrong, only the individual suffers. If they are correct but release
the person, there could be an outbreak. This latter possibility, of course,
depends on whether the person fails to take precautions to avoid contact
with other people. But, that factor is often ignored in practice. This nar-
row, utilitarian view of harm demonstrates a concerning disregard for in-
dividual rights and the reason that due process protections are required.
The 2017 interstate regulations take a similar approach, but flesh out
the requirements authorizing involuntary measures in more detail. The
84. 42 C.F.R § 70.6(a) (2017). Under the regulations, interstate quarantine also re-
quires reasonable belief that the individual may cross state lines or be a source for some-
one who may cross state lines.
85. Id. § 71.32(a) (unchanged by 2017 Rule).
86. U.S. ex rel. Siegel v. Shinnick, 219 F. Supp. 789, 790–91 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
87. Id. at 791.
88. Id.
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regulation’s text, set forth above, authorizes “apprehension, medical ex-
amination, quarantine, isolation, or conditional release” of anyone in the
United States who “is reasonably believed to be infected with a quaran-
tinable communicable disease in a qualifying stage.”89 A qualifying stage
is defined in the regulations as either of two things.90 The first is the pe-
riod in which the infection can be transmitted, which makes sense. The
second is a bit more complicated. It is in the “precommunicable stage,”
but only with a “quarantinable communicable disease [that] would be
likely to cause a public health emergency if transmitted to other
individuals.”91
The regulations state that the reasonable belief that a person is infected
must be based on “articulable facts upon which a public health officer
could reasonably draw the inference that an individual has been exposed,
either directly or indirectly, to the infectious agent.”92 This seems in-
tended to ensure that the official has a scientific basis for suspecting a
person may have been infected. However, as in Siegel, officials may sim-
ply assume that anyone who has been in a country with a particularly
dangerous communicable disease has been exposed.93
It is possible that the outbreak potential of quarantinable communica-
ble diseases would justify taking a closer look at people who might have
been exposed to them. Thus, people coming into the United States from a
country having an outbreak of a severe quarantinable disease could be
stopped for a brief interview (an apprehension). However, they pose no
danger if they are able to take, and do take, the necessary precautions to
avoid transmitting infection, whether or not they are actually infected.
Nurse Kaci Hickox is an example of a detainee knowing more about how
to diagnose infection and avoid infecting others than the officials in New
Jersey who placed her in quarantine and those in Maine who sought to do
so.94 The regulations’ complete omission of any consideration of individ-
ual capacity or behavior increases the probability of unnecessary and un-
warranted detentions. As such, these regulations enable actions against
those who pose no threat to the public, are unnecessary to protect the
public’s health, and thus violate substantive due process.
89. 42 C.F.R. § 70.6(a)(1) (2017).
90. Id. § 70.1.
91. Id. The precommunicable stage is further defined as the “earliest opportunity for
exposure.” Id. It is not clear that the “[p]ublic health emergency” language is a substantial
limitation. If a disease is dangerous enough to be placed in the Executive Order list, when
would it not be likely to cause a public health emergency if transmitted to others?
92. Id. The explanation in the Federal Register notes that this comports with standard
public health practice. Control of Communicable Diseases, 82 Fed. Reg. 6890, 6906 (Jan.
19, 2017) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 70, 71).
93. See Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn. v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv-00201, 2017 WL 4897048,
at *3–4 (D. Conn. 2017) (describing the quarantine of two plaintiffs who were in Liberia
but working on data analysis and were never exposed to anyone who had Ebola).
94. Kaci Hickox, Her Story: UTA Grad Isolated at New Jersey Hospital in Ebola Quar-
antine, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.dallasnews.com/ebola/head
lines/20141025-uta-grad-isolated-at-new-jersey-hospital-as-part-of-ebola-quarantine.ece
[https://perma.cc/73JX-6W8G].
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There are good reasons to be skeptical of allowing such broad discre-
tion to officials. History shows that officials have often enforced measures
like quarantine and civil commitment disproportionately against minori-
ties, immigrants, and the poor.95 Infectious disease emergencies are typi-
cally accompanied by paranoia and fear, and “commonly trigger
retributive and discriminatory instincts, so that actual quarantines often
impose inhumane, stigmatizing, or even penal treatment upon persons
who are confined based on caprice or even prejudice.”96 For this reason
perhaps, some observers argue that it will be important to ensure that the
regulations are enforced by qualified officials who base decisions on sci-
ence.97 However, the purpose of having rules is to prevent abuse of dis-
cretion. If the rules authorize discretion broad enough to enable or even
invite abuse, they endanger guarantees of individual liberty.
Quarantine should be seen as the exception to the rule that citizens
retain the liberty to move freely, free from restraint.98 Moreover, broad
use of methods that are meant to be rare exceptions, such as quarantine,
means that exceptions become the rule. When exceptions become the
rule, the rule of law becomes corrupted in the eyes of the public. To have
the public question the rule of law generates not only potential harm to
our democratic system, but more specifically, when the public questions
the legal decisions of the government during infectious outbreaks, this
increases the potential for harm to the public’s health.
2. Procedural Due Process
In criminal law, procedural due process seeks to ensure that those who
are punished are those who have committed a crime. Conversely, invol-
untary isolation is based largely on predictions about the risks individuals
will present in the future.99 Quarantine is based not only on predictions
about the risk of future behavior, but also predictions or guesses about
the presence of infection. For involuntary quarantine and isolation, some
scholars have advocated for requiring all of the procedural protections
found in criminal prosecution.100 At the very least, those whom the state
95. Mariner, Annas & Parmet, supra note 28, at 355–56. See generally HOWARD MAR-
KEL, QUARANTINE! (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1997); ALAN M. KRAUT, SILENT TRAV-
ELERS: GERMS, GENES, AND THE “IMMIGRANT MENACE” (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
1994); PRISCILLA WALD, CONTAGIOUS—CULTURES, CARRIERS, AND THE OUTBREAK
NARRATIVE (Duke Univ. Press 2008).
96. Daniel Markovits, Quarantines and Distributive Justice, 33 J. L. MED. & ETHICS
323, 323 (2005).
97. See Maria Gallucci, New Quarantine Rules Raise Public Health Concerns Under
Trump, MASHABLE (Jan. 25, 2017), http://mashable.com/2017/01/25/donald-trump-cdc-
quarantine-rules/#fV6IfgJ6oOqO [https://perma.cc/9UK6-P6J7] (“The federal quarantine
rules aren’t the issue per se, said Scott Burris . . . . It’s the matter of who will implement
these rules that has public health experts concerned.”).
98. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992); see also infra notes 131–135 and ac-
companying text (discussing that procedural due process allows for narrow exceptions in
acute circumstances with overwhelming governmental interest).
99. Parmet, AIDS, supra note 27, at 85–86.
100. See Parmet, J.S. Mill, supra note 57, at 214 (“Mill advocated that before women
are subjected to forced examinations and detentions, they should be given at least roughly
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seeks to quarantine should be afforded the same procedural protections
civil commitment requires.
The 2017 quarantine regulations miss the mark by failing to incorpo-
rate appropriate procedural due process. Procedural due process rights
for civil commitment include, at a minimum, the following: (1) the right
to legal counsel; (2) adequate written notice of the grounds for commit-
ment; (3) adequate notice of the hearing and opportunity for discovery;
(4) an expeditious hearing by an independent judiciary to avoid unneces-
sary confinement; (5) the right to be present, confront witnesses, and pre-
sent witnesses; (6) clear and convincing standard of proof; and (7) the
right to a transcript for use on appeal.101
Procedural due process in the context of infectious disease control can
incorporate flexibility in responding to different diseases and different in-
dividuals that offer a wide range of risks to the public.102 For example, for
an easily transmissible disease that poses a serious threat of harm, judicial
approval could be sought after initial apprehension.103 Regardless, a de-
termination by an independent judge should be obtained as early as pos-
sible. Quarantine orders for some diseases may last only a few days, so
the judicial determination must happen within hours or days so as not to
render the hearing meaningless. Even persons accused of a crime are en-
titled to a hearing before a judge within forty-eight hours, absent an ex-
treme emergency.104 Remarkably, these regulations require no judicial
determination at all.
Moreover, petitions for quarantines for suspected infection must also
comply with the substantive due process requirements discussed above.
These include scientific evidence to support the necessity of confinement,
including evidence that the person is a potential risk to the public if not
confined, a reasonable duration for confinement based on the character-
istics of the disease in question, and a reasonable place and manner
(home-based quarantine is always preferable if safe).105 Procedures that
fail to meet these basic requirements are prone to errors that result in the
unnecessary confinement of healthy people.
Once a person is apprehended for suspected infection, they can be held
for seventy-two hours before the Director is required to present them
the same procedural protections as are afforded to those who are charged with a criminal
offense.”).
101. Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661, 663 (W. Va. 1980).
102. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976) (describing factors courts can
consider in determining what procedures are due when government deprives anyone of
liberty or property: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous depriva-
tion and the probative value of additional or different procedures; and (3) the govern-
ment’s interest, including fiscal and administrative burdens caused by additional or
different procedures).
103. Parmet, AIDS, supra note 27, at 80–81.
104. Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56–57 (1991).
105. Rothstein, supra note 20, at 6; Ulrich, supra note 11, at 261–62; see also Jew Ho v.
Williamson, 103 F. 10, 23–24 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) (holding that the individuals selected for
quarantine were based on ethnicity and had no evidentiary support to actually help mini-
mize the spread of infection).
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with a written Federal Order of Quarantine.106 Within seventy-two hours
after serving that first order, the Director must reassess whether the indi-
vidual should continue being held.107 Only after the Director has final-
ized and served a second Federal Order based on his reassessment is an
individual allowed to request the only review discussed in the regulations,
a medical review.108 The term medical review is itself somewhat mislead-
ing, as the purpose is to ascertain not whether the person might be in-
fected, but instead “whether the Director has a reasonable belief that the
individual is infected with a quarantinable communicable disease in a
qualifying stage.”109 This medical review is not required unless the indi-
vidual under Federal quarantine expressly requests the review.110 And,
once the review is requested, the regulations provide no time limit on
when the review must take place, only stating that the review be con-
ducted “as soon as practicable.”111
Therefore, a close look at the regulations makes clear that the CDC has
the authority to hold an individual for seventy-two hours before provid-
ing them information in writing as to why they are being detained. But
the CDC can hold that person for at least 144 hours (six days) before they
are allowed to request a medical review.112 And with no hard deadline on
when this review must be conducted, a more accurate description of the
regulations is that an individual can be held for an indeterminate amount
of time before the regulations require a medical review. And yet, this is
not the end of the process.
Once that medical review is conducted, the written report is provided
to the Director, who again has no specified deadline for reviewing the
report or issuing a decision afterward, only needing to do so “as soon as
106. 42 C.F.R. § 70.14(b) (2017). In practice, the Director’s function is likely to be dele-
gated to a local public health or CDC employee.
107. Id. § 70.15(a). The text does not say whether the reassessment must begin or end
within this second seventy-two-hour period.
108. Id. § 70.16(b).
109. Id. § 70.16(c).
110. Id. § 70.16(a).
111. Id. § 70.16(a), (m).
112. In 2005, the CDC proposed new quarantine regulations that were attacked by
many public health experts as ineffective, overly restrictive, and lacking protection for indi-
vidual rights. Control of Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,892 (proposed Nov. 30,
2005). In those proposed regulations, the CDC introduced the odd concept of “provisional
quarantine,” which would allow the agency to hold people for up to three business days
before a review. Parmet, J.S. Mill, supra note 57, at 215–16. This notion, which died when
those proposed regulations were tabled, would have provided more protection for individ-
ual rights than the current regulations, where an individual can be held for an indetermi-
nate amount of time. For criticisms of the 2005 proposed rules, see, for example, Electronic
Privacy Information Center, Comments on Proposed Rule for Control of Communicable
Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,892 (Jan. 30, 2006). Jennifer B. Nuzzo et al., Comments from the
Center for Biosecurity of UPMC on Proposed Revisions to Federal Quarantine Rules, 4
BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY PRAC. & SCI. 204 (2006); New
England Coalition for Law and Public Health, Comments on Interstate and Foreign Quar-
antine Regulations Proposed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Department
of Health and Human Services Control of Communicable Diseases, 42 C.F.R. Parts 70 and
71 (Feb. 2006).
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practicable.”113 Once the report is reviewed and the Director has made a
final decision, the Director must issue a third Federal Order to continue,
modify, or end the quarantine.114 Only after this third Order is served is
an individual allowed to appeal the Order, but an appeal cannot be made
unless there is “a showing of significant, new or changed facts or medical
evidence.”115
Yet, due process requires periodic review of the justification for con-
finement.116 Since a person cannot be confined absent grounds for con-
finement, the state cannot continue to confine a person when those
grounds no longer exist.117 Although the 2017 regulations provide for pe-
riodic review, they fail to require review of the evidence for both ele-
ments of the two-factor test (the disease and the individual’s likely
behavior) and therefore offer inadequate review to determine the
probability that a person poses a danger to the public.118 There should be
no obligation placed on the individual to produce new evidence to receive
a new review of their confinement. All reviews of commitment based on
contagious disease and dangerousness should be quite prompt, since the
period of contagion (and dangerousness) may be relatively brief, perhaps
less than a few weeks. But even a short period of confinement is a depri-
vation of liberty if unjustified in the first place. Allowing an unreasonable
and ambiguous length of time in confinement without a hearing violates
due process rights to an expeditious review to ensure a person’s liberty is
not being infringed unnecessarily.
Many comments on the regulations as first proposed expressed concern
about the lack of a timely review afforded to individuals. The CDC,
rather than increase the protections to conform to traditional procedural
113. 42 C.F.R. § 70.16(m).
114. Id.
115. Id. Therefore, according to the regulations, before an individual can challenge
their detention, which can only occur on a showing of significant new or changed facts or
medical evidence, the prior steps must occur: (1) the individual is interviewed/inspected;
(2) the individual is isolated due to suspected exposure or infection; (3) the first quarantine
order is issued; (4) the first quarantine order is reassessed; (5) a second quarantine order is
issued after reassessment; (6) a medical review must be requested by the individual; (7)
medical review is conducted; (8) the medical reviewer issues a report; (9) the medical re-
view report is evaluated by the Director; (10) the Director issues a third quarantine order.
42 C.F.R. §§ 70.14–16.
116. J.R. v. Hansen, 803 F.3d 1315, 1325 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The Constitution demands
that when a state exercises its power to involuntarily commit its citizens on an ongoing
basis, it must require, not merely permit, review of the propriety of their commitment.”)
(emphasis in original); Doe v. Austin, 848 F.2d 1386, 1396 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[D]ue process
requires that some periodic review take place . . . .”) (emphasis omitted); Clark v. Cohen,
794 F.2d 79, 86 (3d Cir. 1986) (same); Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543, 549 (9th Cir. 1983)
(same).
117. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574–75 (1975); see also Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (“[D]ue process requires that the nature and duration of commit-
ment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed.”).
118. Hansen, 803 F.3d at 1325 (11th Cir. 2015) (The “propriety of ongoing commit-
ment” includes both parts of the two-factor test.).
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elements, relies on the availability of habeas corpus.119 Indeed, the regu-
lations make it clear that “[n]othing in this section shall affect the consti-
tutional or statutory rights of individuals to obtain judicial review of their
Federal detention.”120 But habeas corpus cannot be the sole process
available.121 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit provided this
succinct summary: “[N]o case has permitted habeas to be the primary
review procedure. We assume this is because habeas is by its very nature
not a periodic, state-initiated review, which, as we have just explained, is
required.”122
This is critical because the regulations do not require that an individ-
ual’s constitutional right to judicially challenge their detention be in-
cluded in their written notice.123 The notion that the general public is
aware of their habeas corpus rights and is likely to challenge their quar-
antine in federal court was contradicted during the recent Ebola scare.
Though there is no definitive evidence of how many involuntary quaran-
tine orders were officially issued, one report suggested eighteen states
issued at least forty formal quarantine orders.124 This does not include the
119. But see Christopher Ogolla, Non-Criminal Habeas Corpus for Quarantine and Iso-
lation Detainees: Serving the Private Right or Violating Public Policy?, 14 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 135, 149 (2011) (arguing that, in principle, the writ of habeas corpus can
ensure that health officers’ decisions are not arbitrary and capricious, but in practice, in the
early twentieth century, courts deferred to health officers’ judgment and rarely overturned
quarantine orders). The author notes that most denials of the writ occurred early in the
twentieth Century, with few cases after the 1920s. Id. at 153. This would be prior to many
of the advances in modern medicine, increased knowledge in public health principles for
infectious disease control, and greater protection for constitutional rights.
120. 42 C.F.R. § 70.14(d) (2017).
121. Williams v. Wallis, 734 F.2d 1434, 1439 (11th Cir. 1984).
122. J.R. v. Hansen, 803 F.3d 1315, 1324 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584, 607 (1979)).
123. See 42 C.F.R. § 70.14 (a)(1)–(7) (2017) (stating that the written order, served to
the individual, contain: (1) identity of the quarantined individual or group; (2) location of
the quarantine; (3) explanation of the factual basis for the reasonable belief that the indi-
vidual is in the qualifying stage of a quarantinable communicable disease; (4) explanation
of the reasonable belief that the individual is moving or about to move from one State to
another or is a probable source for someone who may do so; (5) explanation that the
Federal order will be reassessed within 72 hours and an explanation of the medical review;
(6) explanation of the criminal penalties for violating the Federal order; and (7) explana-
tion that if a medical examination is required, the examination will be conducted by an
authorized and licensed health worker, and with prior consent). It is worth noting that
these requirements are for the Federal order, which can be served upon the individual up
to seventy-two hours after initial apprehension. There is nothing in the regulations that
require any information be provided to the individual prior to this order.
124. ACLU & GHJP, supra note 19, at 29. The authors of this report submitted surveys
to the Departments of Health in each state about their quarantine guidelines and how
many people have been subjected to restrictions and only six states responded. Id. at 28.
One state, Connecticut, reported quarantining nine people, but the authors knew of at
least one additional person who was quarantined unofficially for two days in a hotel room.
Id. The report states that no governmental entity collects data on quarantine, and that
unofficial quarantines or “voluntary” quarantines were used on numerous occasions. Id. at
7, 25–27. Many other quarantines were described as “voluntary,” because they were not
directly disobeyed and, thus, never forced government officials to submit an official order.
Yet, the quarantine of Dr. Colin Buck, who received official written notice that “failure to
comply with [home] quarantine is punishable by six months in jail,” demonstrates that
some of these “voluntary” quarantines were involuntary. Id. at 27.
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2815 military service members who were quarantined,125 nor does it fac-
tor in the numerous “voluntary” quarantines that came amid official pres-
sure.126 The CDC itself has reported that 29,789 people were
“monitored” in some fashion by state, local, and territorial health depart-
ments.127 What we do know is that only one was challenged in federal
court.128 As the Ninth Circuit noted, “No matter how elaborate and accu-
rate the habeas corpus proceedings available under [state law] may be
once undertaken, their protection is illusory when a large segment of the
protected class cannot realistically be expected to set the proceedings into
motion in the first place.”129
The review that the regulations do provide is questionable in other re-
spects. Rather than providing for independent judicial review and impar-
tial oversight, the medical review is to be conducted by an individual of
the Director’s choosing, as long as it is not the official who issued the
initial quarantine order.130 This official is charged only with reviewing
whether the Director has a “reasonable belief that the individual is in-
fected with a quarantinable communicable disease in a qualifying
stage,”131 based on the evidence presented at the review.132
The primary purpose of the review is not to assess whether the individ-
ual is infected, exposed, or at risk to behave so as to transmit a harmful
disease. A physical medical examination is only conducted if the medical
reviewer believes “such an examination would assist in assessing the indi-
vidual’s medical condition.”133 In fact, the medical review can be con-
ducted over the phone or by any means the medical reviewer deems
practicable.134 At the conclusion, the designated reviewer is tasked with
making a recommendation, with no deadline mentioned and no specifica-
tion as to whether the Director must follow it or not.135
125. Sheri Fink, Ebola Crisis Passes, but Questions on Quarantines Persist, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/health/ebola-crisis-passes-but-ques-
tions-on-quarantines-persist.html [https://perma.cc/72EU-49QH].
126. ACLU & GHJP, supra note 19, at 29. The report states that there were at least 233
de facto quarantines that stemmed from official pressure. The report also states that many
individuals underwent quarantine based on community pressure. Id.
127. Hyacinte Julien Kabore et al., Monitoring of Persons with Risk for Exposure to
Ebola Virus—United States, November 3, 2014–December 27, 2015, 65 MORBIDITY & MOR-
TALITY WKLY. REP. 1401 (2016).
128. Mayhew v. Hickox, No. CV-2014-36, 2014 Me. Trial Order LEXIS 1 (Dist. Ct. Me.
Oct. 31, 2014). And this quarantine began as a “voluntary” quarantine. ACLU & GHJP,
supra note 19, at 26–27.
129. Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 1981); see also id. at 1022–23 (re-
jecting the state’s argument that “habeas corpus review on demand adequately protects
against erroneous” commitments).
130. 42 C.F.R. § 70.16(e) (2017). The medical reviewer can be “a physician, nurse prac-
titioner, or similar medical professional qualified in the diagnosis and treatment of infec-
tious diseases.” Id. § 70.1.
131. Id. § 70.16(c).
132. Id. § 70.16(e).
133. Id. § 70.16(i).
134. Id. § 70.16(k).
135. Id. § 70.16(e).
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As an important aside, it is also unclear whether this medical examina-
tion mentioned in § 70.16(i), which is ordered as a part of the medical
review, corresponds to the medical examination that the Director may
require as part of a Federal order for quarantine according to
§ 70.12(a).136 The medical examination in § 70.12(b) shall be conducted
only with prior informed consent, and performed by an “authorized and
licensed health worker.”137 What is clear is that individuals have a com-
mon law right to refuse any diagnostic or therapeutic medical procedure,
which was recognized as constitutionally protected by the Supreme Court
in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.138 This raises the
question of whether a refusal could justify continued confinement, a
question left unanswered by the regulations.139
Persons who are civilly committed retain the right to refuse treatment,
including medication.140 The exception to this principle—permitting ad-
ministering anti-psychotic medication to prevent a person civilly commit-
ted for mental illness from imminent harm to himself or others in the
institution141—simply does not apply in cases of commitment for conta-
gious disease.142 The medications available to treat a contagious disease
are designed to cure an infection, not to forestall or end violent behavior.
The U.S. Supreme Court may not have recognized a confined person’s
right under the Fourteenth Amendment to anything beyond reasonably
safe conditions of confinement, freedom from bodily restraints, and nutri-
tionally adequate food.143 Nevertheless, federal appeals courts have rec-
ognized that persons in civil commitment are entitled to better conditions
of confinement than prisoners convicted of a crime.144 Furthermore, it
bears repeating that in the case of quarantine it is unknown whether
these individuals are infected, which distinguishes them from those who
136. Id. §§ 70.12(a), 70.16(i).
137. Id. § 70.12(b).
138. 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
139. A full analysis of this question is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet, the two-
factor test laid out above should be applied here. Though it would be more difficult for the
government to justify continued confinement without confirmation of infection, other in-
formation regarding the characteristics of the disease and the individual could warrant con-
finement. It is important that continued confinement not be used as a coercive threat to
pressure an individual to undergo a diagnostic or medical procedure that they would other-
wise refuse.
140. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 301–03 (1982) (anti-psychotic medication), on re-
mand sub nom., Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1984); Green v. Dormire, 691 F.3d
917, 922 (8th Cir. 2012) (anti-psychotic medication); City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1993) (TB medication).
141. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 236 (1990).
142. Nonetheless, due process is necessary to establish that the forcible use of psycho-
tropic drugs is necessary to prevent harm to a civilly committed patient. Mills, 457 U.S. at
300–01; Jurasek v. Utah State Hosp., 158 F.3d 506, 510–11 (10th Cir. 1998); Kulas v. Valdez,
159 F.3d 453, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).
143. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 312 (1982); see also Ingrassia v. Schafer, 825
F.3d 891, 897 (8th Cir. 2016) (nutritionally adequate food); Mitchell v. Washington, 818
F.3d 436, 443 (9th Cir. 2016) (adequate medical care); Belbachir v. Cty. of McHenry, 726
F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2013) (safety); Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86, 97 (1st Cir. 2001)
(safety).
144. Mitchell, 818 F.3d at 443; Belbachir, 726 F.3d at 979.
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are known to be infected and refuse effective medical treatment or
threaten to behave in ways that could infect others.
In Foucha v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court affirmed that the State has
the burden of proof in a civil commitment proceeding.145 The Court held
that even if the confinement itself were constitutional, it would be “im-
proper absent a determination in civil commitment proceedings.”146 In-
deed, the individual whom the state seeks to confine is “entitled to
constitutionally adequate procedures to establish the grounds for his
confinement.”147
The Supreme Court has sanctioned less stringent procedures in certain
circumstances, but the reasoning and the holdings of those decisions do
not apply to the involuntary confinement of competent adults with no
proof of infection. In Parham v. J.R., the Supreme Court upheld a Geor-
gia statute authorizing parents and guardians to voluntarily seek admis-
sion of their child or ward to a state mental health treatment hospital
subject to a determination by the hospital superintendent that the child is
mentally ill and will likely benefit from hospital care.148 The Court found
that a full adversary hearing before a judge was not constitutionally re-
quired for such children, since the “questions are essentially medical in
character,” and the focus of the determination was whether the child was
mentally ill and could benefit from treatment in the facility, as opposed to
confining the individual for the protection of the public.149 Moreover, the
Court emphasized that to place too onerous a requirement for oversight
would be a “significant intrusion into the parent-child relationship,”
where, absent evidence of abuse or neglect, there is a “presumption that
parents act in the best interests of their child.”150 In the case of commit-
ted children, the Court noted that state departments of child welfare who
have custody of children have a statutory and parens patriae duty to act in
the child’s best interest.151
None of these reasons apply to the involuntary civil commitment of a
competent adult believed to potentially have a contagious disease: the
state does not seek to provide treatment for the adult and has no obliga-
tion to act in the adult’s best interest; and commitment does not depend
solely on the adult’s medical condition but also on his likelihood of trans-
mitting infection to others. Instead, in seeking the civil commitment of an
adult, the state acts as an adversary with the goal of protecting the public
145. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75 (1992); see also O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563, 580 (1975) (Burger, J., concurring) (“Commitment must be justified on the basis
of a legitimate state interest, and the reasons for committing a particular individual must
be established in an appropriate proceeding.”).
146. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 78.
147. Id. at 79. The determination is made on a case-by-case (individual) basis, rather
than relying on group characteristics.
148. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605, 620–21 (1979). The hospital superintendent was
assumed to be a neutral factfinder. Id. at 606.
149. Id. at 609.
150. Id. at 610.
151. Id. at 605, 618.
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rather than helping the adult. This calls for an adversary hearing before a
judge.152
As stated above, due process allows some flexibility in procedures, and
the Supreme Court recognizes that “certain narrow circumstances” may
justify a limited confinement prior to a hearing.153 This is acceptable
when the statute in question “carefully limited the circumstances under
which detention could be sought . . . and was narrowly focused on a par-
ticularly acute problem in which the government interests [were] over-
whelming.”154 As the Court states, in this country “liberty is the norm,
and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited excep-
tion.”155 Yet, these quarantine regulations cannot be categorized as a nar-
row set of circumstances where an individual may be held prior to a civil
hearing. And the regulations certainly do not require the government “to
convince a neutral decision maker by clear and convincing evidence that
no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the commu-
nity,” in a “full-blown adversary hearing.”156
This medical review lacks the adversarial protections typically required
for due process. The individual is authorized to choose a representative,
including a family member, at his or her own expense, but there is no
requirement for representation by an attorney.157 The regulations do per-
mit some financial assistance for the indigent, but only for those making
less than 200% of the federal poverty line qualify, and only if that person
requests assistance and can certify, under penalty of perjury, that they are
indeed indigent.158 Any single individual making $24,280 or more will
152. The case of Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), is similarly distinguishable.
In this case, the Court held that a mentally ill inmate could be administered antipsychotic
drugs against their will if prescribed by a psychiatrist and approved after review by another
psychiatrist, without any other procedural hearing. Id. at 222. This case, unlike one of quar-
antine, relates to an individual who is already confined in a prison, is mentally ill and
unable to control their behavior, and is being provided medication that is for their own
benefit. Therefore, this case cannot negate the procedural due process requirements for
quarantine.
153. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
154. Id. at 81.
155. Id. at 83.
156. Id. at 81. Interestingly, in Foucha, the Supreme Court struck down a law that did
not entitle the individual to an adversarial hearing but instead placed the burden on the
detainee to prove they did not pose any danger to the community, which has similarities to
the new quarantine regulations. Id. at 81–82.
157. 42 C.F.R. § 70.16(f) (2017). While a legal representative may be chosen, those who
are frightened and confused may use this authorization to select a family member or
spouse, rather than someone with legal expertise who understands and can assert their
constitutional rights. Guaranteeing legal representation at any hearing or “review” would
do greater justice to the rights of anyone being held.
158. Id. § 70.16(f).
Indigent means an individual whose annual family income is below 200% of
the applicable poverty guidelines updated periodically in the Federal Regis-
ter by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under the author-
ity of 42 U.S.C. 9902(2) or, if no income is earned, liquid assets totaling less
than 15% of the applicable poverty guidelines.
Id. § 70.1. The 2018 federal poverty guideline for an individual is $12,140 (except Alaska
and Hawaii). Office of the Assistant Sec’y for Planning & Evaluation, Poverty Guidelines,
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have to cover the bill.159 Furthermore, if the government is to cover the
medical expenses, it is the Director, not the individual, who is charged
with appointing a representative.160 Prior to the review, the individual or
their representative will be given reasonable opportunity to examine the
available records that will be used during the review.161 At the review,
the individual and their advocate are able to submit medical or other evi-
dence, though it is the Director’s appointed medical reviewer who deter-
mines, at their own discretion, whether to allow the quarantined party to
present any medical experts on their behalf.162
The importance of due process protections is made clear in the litiga-
tion stemming from the Ebola scare in the United States. Maine Gover-
nor Paul LePage and his Commissioner of Health, Mary Mayhew,
petitioned the Augusta District Court for an order to subject Kaci
Hickox, a nurse who returned home after caring for Ebola patients in
Sierra Leone, to remain inside her Fort Kent home and submit to direct
monitoring, in the belief that she might have been infected with Ebola.163
Judge Charles LaVerdiere issued a carefully considered opinion based on
civil commitment principles. He found no evidence that Nurse Hickox
was infected or that she would pose any risk to the public.164 In fact,
given her training and experience, Nurse Hickox knew far more than the
officials about the symptoms of Ebola and what to do and where to go
(the hospital) if any symptoms appeared. Nurse Hickox has since been a
strong supporter of having lawyers and legal representation in cases such
as hers.165
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Jan. 13, 2018), https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guide-
lines [https://perma.cc/F6MF-MCU7].
159. See id.
160. 42 C.F.R. § 70.16(f).
161. Id. § 70.16(g).
162. Id. § 70.16(f).
163. Despite the misapplication of quarantine, this procedure is more closely aligned
with due process protections, given that they sought a judicial order rather than simply
issuing an administrative order from the health department.
164. Mayhew v. Hickox, No. CV-2014-36, 2014 Me. Trial Order LEXIS 1 (Dist. Ct. Me.
Oct. 31, 2014) (“The State has not met its burden at this time to prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence that limiting Respondent’s movements to the degree requested is ‘neces-
sary to protect other individuals from the dangers of infection. . . .’”). Ms. Hickox agreed
to an order that she continue to stay in contact with the health department until November
10, 2014, and notify them if any symptoms appeared. Id. No symptoms ever appeared, and
the order expired. Nurse Hickox never had Ebola. This case also shows the importance of
having independent judicial oversight, rather than review by an employee of the agency
that gave the initial quarantine order.
165. Kaci Hickox, When a Nurse Needs an Attorney: U.S. Quarantine Policy, PETRIE-
FLOM CENTER BILL OF HEALTH BLOG (May 31, 2017), http://blogs.harvard.edu/bil-
lofhealth/2017/05/ [https://perma.cc/CC48-LECM]. Ms. Hickox recently settled her lawsuit
against New Jersey with an agreement that enhances rights for those who are subjected to
quarantine orders. Under the settlement, anyone who is quarantined in New Jersey can
contest the order, has the right to legal counsel, is given prior notice of any hearings, the
right to send and receive communications, and the right to privacy so long as it does not
interfere with vital public health needs. Marc Santora, New Jersey Accepts Rights for Peo-
ple in Quarantine to End Ebola Suit, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/07/27/nyregion/new-jersey-accepts-rights-for-people-in-quarantine-to-end-ebola-
suit.html [https://perma.cc/CV8M-GWKH].
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Adherence to due process requirements may help protect individuals
from being mistakenly confined, but they do not ensure that officials are
held accountable for violating individual rights. Of the relatively few
cases challenging civil commitment, most have been brought under either
42 U.S.C. § 1983166 or habeas corpus.167 While § 1983 appears to offer a
remedy after the fact, courts often grant qualified immunity to state offi-
cials who reasonably or even mistakenly believe their actions did not vio-
late a clearly established constitutional right.168 Most reported cases of
relevant § 1983 claims involve persons civilly committed for mental illness
and dangerousness, often after committing sex crimes, who are more
likely to have legal representation than persons subjected to quarantine
or isolation. Thus, § 1983 does not appear to offer a significant remedy to
persons wrongfully confined for having a contagious disease.
New Jersey Governor Chris Christie and Connecticut Governor Dan-
nel Malloy were each sued in separate state court actions for violating the
rights of their citizens by imposing unnecessary and scientifically unjusti-
fied quarantines of persons believed to have been exposed to Ebola.169
Yet, the trial courts initially dismissed both lawsuits on the ground that
the government officials were entitled to qualified immunity for their
actions.170
The defense of qualified immunity prevents those who are harmed
from pursuing justice and removes any potential deterrence of capricious
official actions.171 Despite the quarantines’ lacking any evidentiary basis
and the harms that were suffered, there was no avenue of redress for
those whose rights were violated. The application of qualified immunity
not only allows officials to avoid accountability for constitutional viola-
tions, but also may encourage officials to believe that they can act with
166. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 587 (1979); J.R. v. Hansen, 803 F.3d 1315,
1319 (11th Cir. 2015); Ammons v. Wash. Dep’t of Social & Health Servs., 648 F.3d 1020,
1022–23 (9th Cir. 2011).
167. See, e.g., Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661, 661–62 (W. Va. 1980).
168. See, e.g., Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 1000 (9th Cir. 2007); Hickox v. Christie,
205 F. Supp. 3d 579, 588–89 (D.N.J. 2016); Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn. v. Malloy, No.
3:16-cv-00201, 2017 WL 4897048, at *1, *9–13 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2017).
169. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 584; Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL 4897048
at *1, *9–13.
170. Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 596, 599; Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn., 2017 WL
4897048 at *1–3. It is worth noting that in O’Connor v. Donaldson, the Court found that an
official could be liable for damages for violating a person’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 if he “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his
sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of [Donaldson], or if
he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional
rights or other injury to [Donaldson].” O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975);
see also Brief for Robert M. Palumbos et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Libe-
rian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn. v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv-00201, 2017 WL 4897048 at *23–24 (D.
Conn. Mar. 30, 2017) (criticizing the court’s analysis on the merits of using quarantine).
171. Another point should be made, though we lack the space to address it in full. As
long as officials, including judges, are unclear on the substantive due process standards for
confinement, qualified immunity will be a viable defense based on the theory that the
constitutional standards were not settled or clear. And with so few cases, judges in one
state may be unaware of the standards applicable to such a case and, thus, think the law is
unclear.
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impunity. In the absence of adequate remedies, therefore, it is all the
more important that the legal process for initiating involuntary detention
adequately protect individuals from arbitrary confinement. The looser the
standards for action— such as a reasonable belief—and the greater the
discretion granted to officials, the more likely they are to take the more
coercive path, protecting themselves rather than the individual or the
public. Thus, the need for due process protections that limit unjustified
quarantines prior to their imposition are essential to protecting individual
rights.
The 2017 regulations are troubling from both a legal and a medical
perspective. Legally, they place substantial power in the hands of the
CDC Director and anyone the Director chooses to carry out the regula-
tions. More important, the regulations offer those suspected of being ex-
posed to a disease little protection from erroneous, arbitrary, or
discriminatory decisions in an intra-agency review. Medically, they enable
scientifically unjustified decisions by CDC officials, such as the quaran-
tine orders seen in the Ebola scare. Decisions that could result in losing
one’s liberty for weeks demand adherence to clear legal principles. And
these legal principles demand evidence-based medicine.
Scientifically supported quarantine not only meets constitutional re-
quirements of necessity,172 but it also helps to garner trust among the
public that it will be protected from real risks and not subjected to arbi-
trary coercion. Such trust, in turn, can encourage public cooperation with
more general public health recommendations to prevent the spread of
disease. Therefore, they help to protect the individual and the
community.
III. MAINTAINING THE RULE OF LAW
It is well past time to move involuntary quarantine and isolation in all
their forms from their archaic formulation—resembling something akin
to imprisonment—to the rarely needed, last resort mechanisms that they
are and should be.173 While contagious disease control remains an essen-
tial objective of public health policy, it can be achieved while still respect-
ing individual rights. Constitutional doctrine governing individual liberty
interests has progressed far beyond the days in which states could blithely
confine individuals merely because they were believed to be mentally
ill,174 and sterilize young women to prevent the birth of “feebleminded”
children.175 Science, medicine, technology, and sociology have also ad-
172. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text (describing cases dismissing quaran-
tine orders that lacked scientific justification).
173. Donald G. McNeil Jr., Using a Tactic Unseen in a Century, Countries Cordon off
Ebola-Racked Areas, N.Y. TIMES (AUG. 12, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/13/sci-
ence/using-a-tactic-unseen-in-a-century-countries-cordon-off-ebola-racked-areas.html
[https://perma.cc/9DM8-PZ4M].
174. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DIS-
ORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 271 (Routledge 2002) (1971).
175. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927).
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vanced to offer tools to address the needs of the population facing a pos-
sible epidemic.176 A modern approach to infectious disease control
requires cooperation among local, state, tribal, and national governments
and, most importantly the public.177 The World Bank, the United Na-
tions, and the National Academy of Medicine, among others, recognize
the need for broad cooperation to contain disease outbreaks, but quaran-
tine is not among the measures recommended.178 There is a symbiotic
relationship among respect for individual rights, public trust, and public
cooperation with public health recommendations. Cooperation from the
public is essential to a more effective effort in containing the spread of
disease.
The preceding section argued that the quarantine regulations fail to
adequately respect individual rights. Another standard against which to
evaluate these regulations is whether they are likely to encourage or in-
hibit public trust and cooperation. Before doing so, it may be useful to
consider the possible motivation for their adoption.179
A. RULEMAKING AND POLITICS
Despite President Trump’s harsh public comments during the Ebola
crisis, these quarantine regulations were published under the Obama ad-
ministration the day before inauguration.180 So, why the rush to issue
these new rules? The comments section in the Federal Register offers two
justifications: (1) responding to the Ebola epidemic, as well as outbreaks
of MERS and measles;181 and (2) increasing transparency by clarifying
and codifying “current practice . . . to make the public aware of their
use.”182
The first justification essentially admits that a significant part of the
motivation was the Ebola scare. Dr. Thomas Frieden, who was the Direc-
tor of the CDC during the Ebola crisis, stated that the “CDC has been
preparing for this day, working around the clock,” to stop Ebola from
176. See Wendy K. Mariner et al., Jacobson v. Massachusetts: It’s Not Your Great-
Great-Grandfather’s Public Health Law, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 581, 582 (2005).
177. See COMM’N ON A GLOBAL HEALTH RISK FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE, THE
NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF GLOBAL SECURITY: A FRAMEWORK TO COUNTER INFECTIOUS
DISEASE CRISES 2 (2016) [hereinafter GHRF COMMISSION] (“Building effective public
health systems requires more than surveillance systems, laboratory networks, and clinical
capabilities. Engaging and communicating with communities is critical. Community aware-
ness enhances surveillance.”).
178. Id.; see also The World Bank, supra note 6, at 11–12.
179. Robert Gatter, Ebola, Quarantine, and Flawed CDC Policy, 23 U. MIAMI BUS. L.
REV. 375, 399 (2015).
180. On August 1, 2014, then-candidate Donald Trump tweeted, “The U.S. cannot allow
EBOLA infected people back. People that go to far away places to help out are great-but
must suffer the consequences!” Steven Hatch, How the Ebola Crisis Helped Launch Don-
ald Trump’s Political Career, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2017/04/trump-ebola-tweets/ [https://perma.cc/4CNA-AD9N].
181. Quarantine Regulations, supra note 12, at 6890.
182. Quarantine Regulations, supra note 12, at 6894.
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spreading within our borders.183 When the first domestic case of Ebola
appeared in Texas Presbyterian Hospital, Frieden attempted to calm the
public’s nerves by describing the differences between the United States
and the West African region where the epidemic was at its peak. Accord-
ing to the CDC Director, “the United States has a strong health care
system and dedicated public health professionals—all hard at work right
now—to make sure this case will not threaten the community at large, or
the nation.”184 This all meant that despite the first Ebola case in the
United States, the CDC Director was confident “we will stop Ebola in its
tracks.”185
While these comments were certainly aimed at assuaging public fears,
they likely were more harmful than helpful to the CDC. After all, the
“strong health care system” had failed to diagnose Thomas Duncan on his
first visit.186 Once nurses caring for Mr. Duncan, the initial case of Ebola
in the U.S., became infected (one flew on a commercial flight after caring
for Mr. Duncan), the CDC and its Director began to lose their credibil-
ity.187 Some called for Dr. Frieden’s resignation, with many believing that
efforts to contain Ebola were “mismanaged, causing risk to scores of ad-
ditional people.”188 President Obama then put Ron Klain, a lawyer, in
charge of coordinating the national Ebola response.189
After these events, it is possible that the agency simply wanted to
strengthen—or clarify, as the agency put it—its ability to take more con-
crete action in the event of another contagious disease scare. The options
for concrete action are limited, since the CDC has no legal authority over
hospitals or health care providers. But, it does have authority to carry out
the federal quarantine statute, and the agency may have believed that
greater regulatory powers under that statute might help prevent a disease
like Ebola from entering the country. It might also protect the CDC from
future criticism. The CDC may have been unwilling to risk being blamed
183. Tom Frieden, Why U.S. Can Stop Ebola in its Tracks, CNN (Oct. 2, 2014), http://
www.cnn.com/2014/10/02/opinion/frieden-ebola-first-patient/index.html [https://perma.cc/
CS75-C58M].
184. Id. This language is particularly interesting given the fact that the CDC has no
legal authority over the health care system. The CDC’s influence over hospitals and health
care workers comes in the form of data, research, training, and offering their expertise as a
resource.
185. Id.
186. Greg Botelho & Jacques Wilson, Thomas Eric Duncan: First Ebola Death in the
U.S., CNN (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/08/health/thomas-eric-duncan-
ebola/index.html [https://perma.cc/7YDY-K3B6].
187. Lauren French & Jennifer Haberkorn, CDC Director in Hill Hot Zone, POLITICO
(Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/10/hearing-will-have-public-health-offi-
cials-grilled-on-ebola-111943 [https://perma.cc/QN55-DQ87].
188. Will Dunham, U.S. Lawmakers Blast Government’s Ebola Response, Urge Travel
Ban, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-ebola-usa-idUSKC
N0I517E20141016 [https://perma.cc/VSJ2-6YDN].
189. Erin Dooley & Mary Bruce, President Obama Names Ron Klain “Ebola Czar”,
ABC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/ron-klain-meet-president-
obamas-ebola-czar/story?id=26269061 [https://perma.cc/ST9B-P6DD].
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for a future outbreak.190
The second stated justification, increasing transparency, is also a curi-
ous one. Agencies do not typically issue regulations to merely make the
public aware of practices they already use. The Federal Register states
that “[i]ncreased clarity around due process may result in fewer resources
and time expended by individuals under orders and HHS/CDC in dis-
agreements over HHS/CDC’s authority to issue Federal public health or-
ders that limit an individual’s movement.”191 Could the real motivation
be to reduce the “potential costs of litigation,” which the comments cite
as an added benefit to this new transparency?192
Both justifications suggest that the CDC hoped to strengthen its role
and reputation in outbreaks, whether through enhanced authority or in-
creased clarity about its authority. Indeed, during Ebola they were largely
ignored by states and blamed by the public, often unfairly. If the agency is
going to have its credibility questioned, why not assert its jurisdiction
more authoritatively in the regulations?
Yet these regulations can hardly be described as an effective method of
increasing the credibility of an agency long known for its technical and
scientific infectious disease expertise, data collection, and data analysis.
Fortifying the agency’s ability to quarantine people based on reasonable
belief of infection alone is unlikely to raise public esteem for an agency
whose foundation is supposed to be science and data.
Indeed, the CDC already made what appeared to be politically moti-
vated policy decisions while under political fire.193 When Dr. Craig Spen-
cer went to the hospital and was diagnosed with Ebola after travelling
through New York City, the CDC amended its Ebola guidelines to pro-
vide a stricter policy for quarantining individuals who were asymptom-
atic, even though the CDC surely knew that they could not spread the
disease.194 Maine followed the CDC’s new guidance, but the Maine dis-
trict court judge found that the Constitution did not permit the involun-
tary isolation of an asymptomatic person.195 Such an order lacked
scientific justification and ran counter to medical understanding of how
190. See Gatter, supra note 179, at 389–90 (“the agency could not take the political
embarrassment of yet another mistake.”).
191. Quarantine Regulations, supra note 12, at 6962.
192. Quarantine Regulations, supra note 12, at 6962.
193. See Gatter, supra note 179, at 389–90 (“[T]he CDC and its director came under
fire for its missteps and perceived failure to protect Americans adequately.”).
194. See Gatter, supra note 179, at 393–95 (putting the CDC’s new issuance of amended
guidelines into the context of the cases of Ebola in the U.S.). Conversely, the CDC could
have held up Dr. Spencer as an illustration of why strict quarantines were unnecessary. As
a physician with Ebola expertise, once he began experiencing symptoms, he sought hospi-
tal services to test and treat him. The prior actions he took, whether riding public transit or
a night out bowling, provided no risk to the public. This was a missed opportunity for
public education, one of the most important roles the CDC should embrace. For Dr. Spen-
cer’s own account of his experience, see Craig Spencer, Having and Fighting Ebola—Pub-
lic Health Lessons from a Clinician Turned Patient, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1089 (2015).
195. Mayhew v. Hickox, No. CV-2014-36, 2014 Me. Trial Order LEXIS 1, 2–3 (Dist. Ct.
Me. Oct. 31, 2014).
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Ebola is transmitted.196 Issuing amended guidelines did not enhance the
CDC’s credibility,197 and the 2017 quarantine regulations are unlikely to
do so either.
B. PUBLIC TRUST
The most important partner in containing the spread of disease is the
public.198 Quarantine is one of the most drastic measures the state can
take in the name of public health, and public trust is essential to its suc-
cess.199 People who fear a forced quarantine have no desire to spread
disease or go untreated. In fact, the first case of Ebola in the United
States during the scare stemmed from Thomas Duncan, mentioned
above, seeking treatment for feeling ill. It was the hospital and its em-
ployees who missed the diagnosis at his initial visit. When Mr. Duncan
returned, the hospital somehow allowed the infection to spread to a
nurse. Mr. Duncan had no insidious desire to spread the infection nor was
he unwilling to cooperate with behavioral guidelines.
People are concerned with being held unnecessarily, isolated from fam-
ily and friends, stigmatized, and potentially losing employment or hous-
ing. Without assurances that their concerns will be satisfied—that they
will not suffer the harms they fear—the public is less likely to voluntarily
take recommended precautions, such as staying home and avoiding con-
tact with other people.200 There is widespread agreement among public
health experts that public cooperation with health recommendations de-
pends upon understanding what the risk is, how to avoid it, and why.201
Accurate information provides the basis for that understanding, which in
turn allows the public to trust the recommendations and cooperate with
them.
The SARS outbreak is an example of an international incident that
required the coordination of local, state, national, and even global gov-
196. Gatter, supra note 179, at 377–78; see also Mark A. Rothstein, From SARS to
Ebola: Legal and Ethical Considerations for Modern Quarantine, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV.
227, 259–61 (2015) (describing how the changes in quarantine policy ran counter to the
known epidemiological understanding of Ebola transmission).
197. See Rothstein, supra note 196, at 260–61 (“The CDC’s revision of its guidance,
however, by following more aggressive state policies, may have increased doubts about the
adequacy of CDC’s initial recommendations, thereby seeming to confirm the wisdom of
the expanded quarantine measures imposed by some state governments.”).
198. See GHRF COMMISSION, supra note 177, at 2 (“Trust and cooperation of the local
population is a vital component of any response strategy.”).
199. Parmet, AIDS, supra note 27, at 54.
200. See, e.g., Clete DiGiovanni et al., Factors Influencing Compliance with Quarantine
in Toronto During the 2003 SARS Outbreak, 2 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BI-
ODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC. & SCI. 265, 267–70 (2005) (discussing the need to help those
who are in quarantine with their care, supplies and income).
201. GHRF COMMISSION, supra note 177, at 2; see also Judith Walzer Leavitt, Public
Resistance or Cooperation?: A Tale of Smallpox in Two Cities, 1 CONTROVERSIES IN SCI. &
TECH.: FROM MAIZE TO MENOPAUSE 311, 321 (Daniel Lee Kleinman, Abby J. Kinchy, &
Jo Handelsman eds., 2005).
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ernance to minimize the damage.202 Uncertainty surrounding the nature
of the infection and best practices in controlling it allowed its initial rapid
spread.203 A few countries relied heavily on quarantine to the detriment
of containment efforts. During the SARS outbreak, a rumor that the Chi-
nese government was planning a large-scale involuntary quarantine
caused nearly 250,000 people to flee.204 Despite the fact that most people
were willing to take precautionary measures voluntarily, the threat of co-
ercive government action caused many to panic.205 People who fear un-
necessary confinement may be more likely to lie or simply avoid
interacting with the government or health care system in general. Today,
it is relatively easy for people who might be infected to avoid coercive
government actions by going someplace else, where they may spread in-
fection to others, thereby putting other communities—or even other
countries—at risk. In this way, coercion can undermine the very public
health goal it is intended to serve.
In contrast, countries like Canada that implemented strict infection
control measures in hospitals were able to bring the SARS epidemic
under control without resorting to involuntary isolation, except in a few
instances.206 About 30,000 people voluntarily stayed home (known as
“sheltering in place”).207 While the United States may not have a strong
tradition of social solidarity like Canada, its population does have a repu-
tation for fiercely defending individual rights. Thus, the use of involun-
tary isolation or quarantine may find greater resistance in this country
than elsewhere.208 The well-publicized case of Ms. Hickox, her quaran-
tine, and the stigma and public resentment she faced undoubtedly influ-
enced public perceptions about the negative impact of quarantine
orders.209
202. Jason W. Sapsin et al., SARS and International Legal Preparedness, 77 TEMP. L.
REV. 155, 167 (2004).
203. Laura C. Rosella et al., Pandemic H1N1 in Canada and the Use of Evidence in
Developing Public Health Policies—A Policy Analysis, 83 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1, 1 (2013).
204. Mariner et al., supra note 176, at 587.
205. Id. The Director of the CDC Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, Marty
Cetron, has emphasized that locking people up and using armed guards triggers the human
instinct to flee. Instead, he notes, “what you really need is a compelling argument, public
trust, and community engagement to voluntarily participate.” Marty Cetron, Dir., CDC
Div. of Glob. Migration & Quarantine, Panelist at O’Neill Institute’s Colloquium: The
West African Ebola Epidemic: How Can It Be Contained and How Can We Prevent the
Next One? (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.c-span.org/video/?321282-1/discussion-combating-
ebola-epidemic [https://perma.cc/3TLH-FKEB].
206. Mark A. Rothstein et al., Quarantine and Isolation: Lessons Learned from SARS,
A Report to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 55–56, 59, INST. FOR
BIOETHICS, HEALTH POLICY & LAW (Nov. 2003), http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/cdc/
SARS_REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/SW53-TLW3]; Tomislav Svoboda et al., Public
Health Measures to Control the Spread of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome During
the Outbreak in Toronto, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2352, 2359–60 (2004).
207. George J. Annas, The Statue of Security: Human Rights and Post-9/11 Epidemics,
38 J. HEALTH L. 319, 333 (2005).
208. Rothstein et al., supra note 196, at 259, 278–79.
209. Kevin Sack et al., Life in Quarantine for Ebola Exposure: 21 Days of Fear and
Loathing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/us/life-in-quar-
antine-for-ebola-exposure-21-days-of-fear-and-loathing.html [https://perma.cc/7RCZ-
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There is no evidence that the public is reluctant to cooperate with pub-
lic health officials, especially in the midst of an outbreak, as long as the
public has confidence in official recommendations.210 But public officials
must earn that trust. This requires public health officials to obtain accu-
rate information, communicate honestly with the public, and ensure that
the public has the resources necessary to cooperate with reasonable
recommendations.
The public needs to be able to trust that public health officials are mak-
ing reasonable and objective decisions based on credible evidence. Thus,
the first requirement for controlling the spread of disease is accurate in-
formation. This includes information about the infectious agent, how it
can be diagnosed, its pathogenicity, how it is transmitted, whether there is
any vaccine or treatment, as well as the absence of knowledge or the de-
gree of uncertainty about any facts. It also includes information for public
health officials about where people have traveled, what they have been
exposed to, and whom they have been in contact with—to identify where
a pathogen may be.211 These are the factors that public health officials
regularly evaluate in order to decide what preventive or mitigating mea-
sures are appropriate. This information should be shared with the public,
together with recommendations for avoiding exposure to infection and
what to do if people believe they may have been exposed or infected.
Therefore, the second requirement for gaining public trust is trans-
parency. Honestly communicating what is and is not known can reassure
the public that officials care about the welfare of those who are asked to
shelter in place or are involuntarily placed under movement restrictions,
rather than treating them as threats to the public. Unexplained recom-
mendations can appear arbitrary. Measures that seem arbitrary or puni-
tive have the potential to cause people to cease complying with public
health policies in general.212 In contrast, transparency about what the
public can do is more likely to encourage people to embrace a positive
role for themselves— as partners in the effort to contain the epidemic,
rather than suspects to be tracked down and locked up like criminals.
6TZQ (describing the impact of stigma on individuals who were exposed but never
infected).
210. George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Civil Liberties, 346 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1337, 1339 (2002); see also Leavitt, supra note 201, at 319 (describing the speed at
which New Yorkers were vaccinated, with thousands lining up and waiting patiently to
receive their inoculation). Cultural norms in the United States may appear to conflict with
public cooperation from government orders during an outbreak. Mark A. Rothstein, Are
Traditional Public Health Strategies Consistent with Contemporary American Values?, 77
TEMP. L. REV. 175, 177, 188–92 (2004). However, the desire to avoid contagious diseases
and to be treated for infection are strong as well, and government assistance could be seen
as beneficial in these circumstances. Moreover, providing assistance to those in quarantine
and isolation, such as finances for lost wages and treatment, would help reduce the resis-
tance that these cultural norms may generate.
211. This is why the regulations themselves detail information they require from airline
and vessel staff. 42 C.F.R. §§ 71.4–71.5 (2017).
212. Parmet, J.S. Mill, supra note 57, at 218.
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C. FACILITATING PUBLIC COOPERATION
A third requirement for encouraging public cooperation in controlling
epidemics is making it possible for people to cooperate. The National
Academy of Medicine committee offers two lessons from the historical
use of quarantine:
Two lessons leap out: first that caregiving is an essential component
of an outbreak response strategy, in part because it is the right thing
to do, and in part because it is essential to enlisting community sup-
port; and second, that effective community engagement requires un-
derstanding the context, including the history, that will inform
people’s attitudes and behaviors.213
An important aspect of community engagement is that it requires a
holistic understanding of the harms people can and do endure during
epidemics, including those stemming from a liberal use of coercive move-
ment restrictions.
When discussing the Ebola scare in the United States, the evaluation of
harm is typically focused on the spread and lethality of the disease. Many
claim the Ebola response was a resounding success, because there were
so few cases. Yet, infection is not the only harm to the public during an
outbreak.214 Indeed, the hysteria, politicization, and rejection of evi-
denced-based legal decisions created more harm than the disease itself.
People were threatened by law enforcement and public officials.215 Chil-
dren were bullied in schools.216 Individuals were not allowed to work, or
in some circumstances dismissed from their jobs.217 While the spread of
misinformation, largely through the media, carries much of the blame,
those who embraced, enforced, or advocated for overly strict quarantine
measures certainly fanned the flames.218
People want to be protected from contracting diseases and treated
when they are unlucky enough to become infected. The 2017 regulations
focus almost exclusively on the former, with little regard for the latter.
213. GHRF COMMISSION, supra note 177, at 44.
214. See Parmet, J.S. Mill, supra note 57, at 210 (“[T]he American law of quarantine
deviates from Mill’s principles by disregarding the social costs and disparate impact of
quarantine and by authorizing quarantine even when a different, less coercive mix of pub-
lic policies would better protect the public’s health.”); see also Ulrich, supra note 11, at 283
(“The Ebola ‘outbreak’ in the United States was relatively small and, yet, hundreds of lives
were impacted by the actions of the government, rather than by the disease itself.”).
215. See, e.g., ACLU & GHJP, supra note 19, at 27 (describing a physician at Stanford
who was threatened with six months in jail if he fought a “voluntary” quarantine).
216. See Amanda Terkel, Oklahoma Teacher Will Have to Quarantine Herself After
Trip to Ebola-Free Rwanda, HUFFPOST POLITICS (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.huffington
post.com/2014/10/28/ebola-rwanda-oklahoma-teacher_n_6062726.html [https://perma.cc/
E4UK-PCRE] (finding two boys beaten by other students in the Bronx after returning
from a trip to Senegal, which had one case of Ebola).
217. For example, contacts of Thomas Eric Duncan were subjected to mandatory quar-
antine after his death from Ebola. Though none of them became infected, many were una-
ble to return to work or school afterward. Sack et al., supra note 209.
218. See Ulrich, supra note 11, at 258 (“[F]ailure to assess the harm caused by those in
leadership positions whose desire to appease the fearful masses lead them to make deci-
sions and wield the law in a manner that may have jeopardized disease control efforts.”).
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Ignoring the harm that individuals in quarantine can face is another way
to deter public cooperation.
To adequately address potential harm, the regulations should take into
account not only medical treatment for the disease but also indirect
harms such as the cost of treatment, lost wages, discrimination, and
stigma.219 There is ample evidence to suggest that people are willing to,
and frequently do, avoid necessary medical care, ignore medical gui-
dance, and behave in ways detrimental to their health because of finan-
cial concerns.220 For most people, quarantine, whether voluntary or
involuntary, means lost wages due to absence from work and often treat-
ment expenses. These financial considerations could influence people’s
willingness to cooperate with public health recommendations. Lost wages
for the good of the public’s health should be deemed a public cost.221 For
example, during the SARS outbreak, the government in Singapore pro-
vided economic assistance to individuals and businesses affected by quar-
antine, while in Hong Kong individuals received daily material and
financial assistance.222 The CDC’s 2017 regulations, however, ignore
these legitimate concerns.
Under the 2017 regulations, the CDC Director may authorize payment
only for the care and treatment of those who are involuntarily quaran-
tined, but payment is at the Director’s discretion and subject to availabil-
ity of federal appropriations.223 With public health constantly a target for
budget cuts, it is unclear whether appropriations will be available at any
given time. The regulations make clear that the CDC will be only a secon-
dary payer, relying first on any public or private insurance the detainee
has to pay for care.224 This does little to help those who are uninsured or
underinsured. Even the indigent, who can request that the CDC pay for
an advocate during medical review, have no assurance that treatment
costs will be covered.225
Individuals who might have a contagious disease but need to keep
working may avoid health care providers and medical testing in order to
escape the possibility of quarantine. This is especially true if they are only
219. See Parmet, J.S. Mill, supra note 57, at 218 (“Mill argued that policymakers must
look beyond the direct costs of the deprivation of liberty of those who are detained.”).
While the regulations’ ability to tackle issues of discrimination and stigma may be limited,
a more humane approach to the use of quarantine, coupled with CDC efforts to inform the
public, could go a long way to aiding the momentum of no longer allowing those who
sacrifice their liberties for the public’s protection to be ostracized and abused. See also
Ulrich, supra note 11, at 278 (“The inability of the government to provide accurate infor-
mation to the public and enact complimentary legislation to minimize harms suffered only
adds to the injurious effects of infectious diseases.”).
220. See generally DAVID M. CUTLER, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE: STRONG
MEDICINE FOR AMERICA’S HEALTHCARE SYSTEM (2004).
221. An alternative would be to have the employer bear the cost. Whatever the mecha-
nism, people that cooperate with public health recommendations should not bear the fi-
nancial burden. There is no way to protect against lost wages other than to replace them.
222. Sapsin et al., supra note 202, at 160.
223. 42 C.F.R. § 70.13(a)–(b) (2017).
224. Id. § 70.13(c).
225. Id. § 70.16(f).
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paid for hours actually worked.226 After all, employers and coworkers
would be unlikely to know that they may have been exposed to infection.
In addition, the possibility of having to pay for expensive medical treat-
ment may be a serious deterrent to public compliance. Currently there is
little legal protection for people who lose wages or are terminated for
missed work as a result of a voluntary or involuntary quarantine. Massa-
chusetts is the only state to offer compensation to those who are sub-
jected to involuntary quarantine, providing two dollars a day under a
1907 statute.227 Iowa is the only state affording a remedy of reinstatement
for individuals who are terminated due to quarantine.228 A small minority
of states prohibit employment discrimination; however, most of these
laws do not apply to voluntary quarantines.229 The absence of these pro-
tections makes it financially difficult, if not impossible, for a large seg-
ment of the population to cooperate with recommendations for social
distancing, for example, as well as involuntary quarantine.
These financial hardships disproportionately affect lower income popu-
lations. Financial considerations become more troubling under these reg-
ulations since individuals can be held for an indeterminate amount of
time. To encourage cooperation and incentivize individuals to make the
right decisions for the public and for themselves, there must be protec-
tions for employment and compensation for lost wages and treatment
costs. In addition, there should be a provision for ensuring that anyone
quarantined or isolated at home receives whatever is necessary—food,
water, medicines, household supplies, and trash disposal—to live rela-
tively comfortably.230 These steps can mitigate the trauma and cost of
quarantine and show people that they are being treated with respect.
While financial assistance may face political and budgetary obstacles,
avoiding unnecessary quarantines that are not scientifically justified
would be a way to find some extra resources. For example, the expenses
226. According to one report, seventy-eight percent of full-time workers live paycheck
to paycheck. Jessica Dickler, Most Americans Live Paycheck to Paycheck, CNBC (Aug. 24,
2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/24/most-americans-live-paycheck-to-paycheck.html
[https://perma.cc/RSS3-BYBC]. Many workers who are paid hourly do not count as full-
time employees and thus are likely to be struggling as much, if not more.
227. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 95 (Westlaw 2018).
228. Rothstein, supra note 20, at 6.
229. Rothstein, supra note 20, at 6.
230. The regulations require the CDC Director to provide persons involuntarily de-
tained under the federal rules with “adequate food and water, appropriate accommoda-
tion, appropriate medical treatment, and means of necessary communication.” 42 C.F.R.
§ 70.6(b) (2017). Many escaped quarantines in Africa, or attempted to, over fear of starva-
tion. James Harding Giahyue & Bate Felix, Ebola Outbreak Stirs Anger in Fragile Liberia,
REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-ebola-politics/ebola-
outbreak-stirs-anger-in-fragile-liberia-idUSKBN0H106M20140906 [https://perma.cc/
EQM8-BAU3]; Terrence McCoy, The Nightmare of Containing Ebola in Liberia’s Worst
Slum, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning
-mix/wp/2014/08/21/the-nightmare-of-containing-ebola-in-liberias-worst-slum/?utm_
term=.32503e53ea58 [https://perma.cc/SJ4L-R7GM]; Ethan A. Huff, Ebola Quarantine




of unnecessarily quarantining the 2815 U.S. military personnel who were
never exposed to Ebola totaled approximately $2,000 per person.231 This
$5.63 million could have easily covered the expenses of those placed in
quarantine in the United States, with money to spare. Moreover, reci-
procity suggests that if these individuals are foregoing their rights and
liberties in the public’s interest, the least we can do is provide support for
them.
Offering care and support is consistent with an evolution of quarantine
from its penal connotation to a more positive association with participa-
tion in a public service. Typically, those who become infected, or are sim-
ply at risk due to exposure, did nothing wrong. Indeed, the opposite is
true for most of those—physicians and nurses—in the United States who
were infected with Ebola. By treating those who are subjected to quaran-
tine humanely, the government shows the individuals and the general
public that they deserve our praise, admiration, and sympathy, instead of
our scorn.
These steps would also help to reduce problems with stigma. Stigma
attaches to infections and thus stigma attaches to quarantine. Conceal-
ment is the typical individual response, which has the potential to drive
an epidemic underground.232 Though stigma operates through the atti-
tudes and behaviors of people, the law can reinforce and exacerbate it.233
Laws that treat people like pariahs instead of patients can help to gener-
ate perceived stigma causing high levels of stress for those who are using
energy to conceal their disease or potential exposure. And for those who
are unable to avoid quarantine, stigma has the potential to generate its
own indirect harms, through public ridicule and isolation. To avoid this,
law can discourage stigmatizing individuals. Canada, for example, en-
acted legislation during SARS prohibiting discrimination against quaran-
tined individuals and providing them income replacement.234  The goal of
laws governing epidemics should be to identify and help those who have
been exposed, not ostracize them and subject them to additional harms.
IV. THE FEDERAL ROLE
A critique of the CDC’s quarantine regulations is not a denial of the
agency’s critical role in infectious disease control. The concern is that
these regulations appear to replicate an archaic approach to contagious
disease control, allowing officials to make largely unchecked decisions
about individuals’ medical status and liberty.
Yet this does raise the question of what the role of the CDC should be.
Traditionally, the CDC has performed four functions: collecting data
about the prevalence and incidence of diseases; conducting research with
231. Fink, supra note 125.
232. Scott Burris, Disease Stigma in U.S. Public Health Law, 30 J. L. MED. & ETHICS
179, 179, 181 (2002).
233. Id. at 181.
234. Rothstein, supra note 20, at 6.
434 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
that data; providing information to the states, health professionals, and
the general public about how to prevent, control, or treat diseases; and
investigating disease outbreaks at the request of a federal, state, or local
agency or foreign country.235 In essence, the CDC is a research and advi-
sory agency, not a care delivery organization. Its comparative advantage
among agencies within HHS is its epidemiological and scientific expertise
about disease prevention and control. As part of a federal agency, the
CDC is, or should be, the premier source of evidence-based guidance on
how to prevent the spread of contagious disease. This Part examines why
that may not always happen and how to reclaim the agency’s value.
A. EXPERTISE AND CREDIBILITY
Given the realities of modern travel, the ability of any single state to
completely contain a pathogen is limited. The CDC has the knowledge
and experience to recommend control measures and coordinate and mon-
itor a streamlined effort among local, state, tribal, federal, and even inter-
national authorities. It can also educate the public on the threat of any
disease and best practices to minimize risk of harm. The quarantine regu-
lations are a departure from these functions. Because it is a federal
agency, the CDC is the logical agency to investigate the possibility that a
quarantinable communicable disease is arriving at our national bor-
ders.236 Within the states, however, the CDC operates largely in its advi-
sory capacity. State and local health departments have primary
responsibility for identifying and evaluating possible sources of conta-
gious disease. Thus, the accuracy and credibility of CDC recommenda-
tions is of utmost importance if it is to persuade the states to act
responsibly.
While the Ebola “crisis” in the United States was anything but a crisis,
it was often portrayed as such.237 Many media outlets stoked the flames
of hysteria with misinformation and unnecessary dramatization, such as
claims that the virus could mutate into an airborne pathogen or that the
number of cases could reach into the millions in a matter of months.238 In
235. Data Collection and Reporting, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://wwwn.cdc.gov/nndss/data-collection.html [https://perma.cc/M2LY-3BYM] (last up-
dated Feb. 6, 2018).
236. Both the statute and regulations authorize inspections at the border (e.g., airlines,
ships, their passengers and cargo), although the regulations contemplate enforcement by
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 42 U.S.C. § 267 (2012); Quarantine Regulations,
supra note 12, at 6939; 42 C.F.R. § 71.20 (2017).
237. Brady Dennis & Peyton M. Craighill, Ebola Poll: Two-thirds of Americans Wor-
ried About Possible Widespread Epidemic in U.S., WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2014), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/ebola-poll-two-thirds-of-americans-wor
ried-about-possible-widespread-epidemic-in-us/2014/10/13/d0afd0ee-52ff-11e4-809b-8cc0a
295c773_story.html?utm_term=.27cb2caa7d88 [https://perma.cc/9MYJ-WT8U]; see also
Ulrich, supra note 11, at 257–58 (describing media coverage of Ebola and how it exacer-
bated public fear and paranoia).
238. See, e.g., Lizzie Parry, It Is ‘Very Likely’ That the Ebola Virus Will Spread Through
Airborne Particles, Experts Say, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
health/article-2961381/It-likely-Ebola-virus-spread-airborne-particles-say-experts.html
[https://perma.cc/DMS8-CZY3]; Sarah Larimer, Will the Ebola Virus Go Airborne? (And
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situations like this, if the public has no trusted source of information, it
should not be surprising that the media frames the narrative.
With public fear of Ebola steadily increasing, many public officials let
their political interests drive their actions. Governors who were up for
reelection in states like New Jersey and Connecticut decided to issue
strict quarantine orders to asymptomatic individuals, presumably to ap-
pease public demands for protection.239 In fact, many states rejected the
CDC’s initial guidance on responding to Ebola and adopted their own
more restrictive (and scientifically questionable) quarantine policies. New
York Governor Andrew Cuomo held a joint press conference with Gov-
ernor Christie announcing the same quarantine policies as those used in
New Jersey to hold Ms. Hickox.240 Meanwhile, Connecticut Governor
Dannel Malloy, in conjunction with the state’s Commissioner of Public
Health, issued an Ebola response plan that was “more stringent than the
guidelines thus far issued by the [CDC].”241 This led to involuntary quar-
antine orders for several individuals, at least some of whom were never
exposed to Ebola.242
These responses call to mind what Priscilla Wald has called the “out-
break narrative,” in which officials seek control by controlling other peo-
ple who can be characterized—rightly or wrongly—as threats.243
Historically, officialdom often found “threats” of contagious disease
among recent immigrants and lower-income populations, who had few
resources to challenge unwarranted actions.244 That was not the target
population during the Ebola scare in the United States. Still, the tempta-
tion to take control—by controlling anyone who could conceivably be
called a threat—seemed irresistible to some officials. The concern is that
this could happen again, and the quarantine regulations in their current
form do nothing to lessen that concern.
Some have made the point that the regulations are not problematic; it
Is That Even the Right Question?), WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2014/09/15/will-the-ebola-virus-go-airborne-and-is-that-
even-the-right-question/?utm_term=.B5d336f59edf [https://perma.cc/QUH7-HJRM];
Michael T. Osterholm, Opinion, What We’re Afraid to Say About Ebola, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/12/opinion/what-were-afraid-to-say-about-
ebola.html [https://perma.cc/NE9M-Y6D5]; Denise Grady, Ebola Cases Could Reach 1.4
Million Within Four Months, C.D.C. Estimates, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/health/ebola-cases-could-reach-14-million-in-4-months-cdc-
estimates.html?_r=0.
239. ACLU & GHJP, supra note 19, at 8, 26.
240. Press Release, Governor Andrew Cuomo’s Press Office, Governor Andrew
Cuomo and Governor Chris Christie Announce Additional Screening Protocols for Ebola at
JFK and Newark Liberty International Airports (Oct. 24, 2014), https://www.gov
ernor.ny.gov/news/governor-andrew-cuomo-and-governor-chris-christie-announce-addi
tional-screening-protocols-ebola [https://perma.cc/6ZTN-X8RV].
241. Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn. v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv-00201, 2017 WL 4897048, at
*1–3 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2017).
242. Id. at 7–8.
243. WALD, supra note 95, at 2.
244. WALD, supra note 95, at 82–113.
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merely depends on who implements them.245 Yet in a country built on a
foundation of checks and balances created to protect individual liberty, as
well as the public, this assessment misses the point. Regulations should
not be developed in the hope that their implementation will not unneces-
sarily violate individuals’ rights. In the current partisan political climate,
what any person deems an “appropriate” response may be influenced by
political affiliation and the preferences of those in power. For example,
the federal government’s Ebola response under President Obama was
seen as favorable by 76% of Democrats and 54% of Republicans,246
while the federal government’s approach to avian flu under President
Bush was viewed favorably by 72% of Republicans and 52% of
Democrats.247
Ideally, the approach to disease control needs to be depoliticized. In
reality, no politician, regardless of party affiliation, is impervious to the
pressures of the voters, especially when an election looms.248 It is not
enough to simply hope that these new regulations will be implemented
fairly. Safeguards must be in place to ensure that evidence-based deci-
sions are being made. The protection of the public’s health and the re-
spect of individual liberties are not mutually exclusive.
When a health agency loses credibility, the public can more easily dis-
miss its recommendations and question its decisions. Schulman argues
that, in response to public mistrust, “agencies sense their authority slip-
ping and decide to double down with overreaching recommendations.”249
The result is a “cycle of mutual mistrust.”250 Something similar may hap-
pen if an agency feels its budget may be in jeopardy—perhaps due to a
new administration with little regard for public health funding and a de-
sire to cut costs; the agency may seek to defend and strengthen its posi-
tion by emphasizing its importance to national security, for example, or
by asserting more visible control over elements of its portfolio.
According to the explanation for the new regulations, one area where
the CDC sought better control is in identifying passengers and crew
members on airlines and ships that might carry a quarantinable dis-
ease.251 The agency argued that airlines rarely reported passengers and
often not until several days after arrival, when the person had gone home
245. See Gallucci, supra note 97 (“The federal quarantine rules aren’t the issue per se,
said Scott Burris . . . It’s the matter of who will implement these rules that has public health
experts concerned.”).
246. Joseph J. Fins, Editorial, Ideology and Microbiology: Ebola, Science, and Delibera-
tive Democracy, 15 AM. J. BIOETHICS, Apr. 2015, at 1, 2.
247. Id.
248. Though concern over the guidelines may stem from the current president’s com-
ments during the Ebola outbreak, as mentioned earlier, Democratic governors, such as
Governor Cuomo of New York and Governor Malloy of Connecticut, issued strict quaran-
tine guidelines during the Ebola outbreak that ran counter to public health and constitu-
tional principles.
249. Ari N. Schulman, Science Anxiety, HEDGEHOG REV., Fall 2016, http://www.iasc-
culture.org/THR/THR_article_2016_Fall_Schulman.php [https://perma.cc/8S35-EUYG].
250. Id.
251. See supra note 21 (describing the regulations requirements for airplane staff).
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or traveled on.252 The CDC’s desire to get more complete data, both to
contact the person for purposes of contact tracing and monitoring and to
add to its disease database, is clear. The new regulations add more de-
tailed requirements for reporting any “ill person,” which includes anyone
who has a temperature of 100.4° F or more or “feels warm to the touch”
if accompanied by other symptoms, such as “headache with stiff neck” or
“appears obviously unwell” or “other indications of communicable dis-
ease” to be posted in the Federal Register.253 How the pilot or cabin crew
are to assess which people have these symptoms, as opposed to the com-
mon cold or hay fever, for example, remains problematic. Indeed, the
airlines opposed the regulations, citing administrative burden and cost,
and the final rule now requires only that whatever data the airline main-
tains be reported within twenty-four hours after the CDC issues an or-
der.254 Still, the belief is that it will make it easier for the CDC to find
people who might have tuberculosis (TB), which may be the agency’s pri-
mary concern.255 These may be the most likely targets for quarantine
orders.
Whether these quarantine regulations were issued for any or all of the
reasons mentioned above is unclear. But what is clear is that they violate
constitutional and public health principles alike. With its diminished cred-
ibility after the Ebola scare, the CDC can ill afford overreaching that
fosters public mistrust and potentially exacerbates the risk of spreading
disease. The CDC’s credibility and power ultimately stem from public
trust in its science. Yet, “this trust is poisoned by the way science has
become weaponized in political debates.”256
B. PRAGMATIC PUBLIC HEALTH
The CDC should rise above politicized science and take a more practi-
cal approach to infectious disease control. As the agency certainly knows,
252. Quarantine Regulations, supra note 12, at 6919, 6930.
253. 42 C.F.R. § 71.1 (2017).
254. Id. § 71.4. While this may appear to be a concession to the airlines, airline compa-
nies today collect most of the data required anyway, including passport or travel document
numbers, telephone numbers, email addresses, date of birth, country of residence, and pri-
macy contact person.
255. In 2015, the majority (66.4%) of the 9,557 cases of TB in the United States were
among foreign-born persons, consistent with other years. Reported Tuberculosis in the
United States, 2015, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 4 (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/tb/statis-
tics/reports/2015/pdfs/2015_surveillance_report_FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EP4-
ZA9L]. The most visible case of TB in a U.S. citizen was that of Andrew Speaker. Neither
the state nor the CDC issued any order restricting his movements. After he traveled
abroad for his wedding—before planned treatment for multidrug-resistant TB in the
U.S.—the CDC mistakenly concluded that he had extensively drug-resistant TB and asked
the Department of Homeland Security to put him on the terrorist no-fly list. He took
precautions and apparently did not infect anyone. Arriving in the United States, Speaker
checked himself into Bellevue Hospital in New York City, as requested by the CDC, and
was then served with a federal quarantine order. For a summary of this case, see Speaker v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d
1371, 1374–75 (11th Cir. 2010); Mariner, Annas, & Parmet, supra note 28, at 361–63.
256. Schulman, supra note 249.
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quarantine alone cannot, and will not, prevent or control any outbreak. It
has not succeeded in the past and is ill-suited to the realities of the con-
temporary world.
There may be a few instances in which involuntary quarantine of an
individual with a quarantinable disease is necessary, but these are re-
markably rare cases.257 The regulations ignore the practicalities of imple-
menting them efficiently to protect both the public and the rights of the
individual. The regulations rely entirely on various public health officials
all within one agency making accurate and fair decisions. From the appre-
hension of an individual to determine exposure and risk of infection, to
the various official orders and re-orders, to the medical examination, to
the potential appeal, and all of the procedures in between, the steps it
takes to finalize a quarantine are lengthy and unwieldy.
Experience suggests that “[t]he fewer the steps involved in carrying out
the program, the fewer the opportunities for a disaster to overtake it.”258
Simplicity in policy is desirable because it increases efficiency and mini-
mizes the possibility of a break in the chain of steps that causes the whole
process to collapse.259 What appears to be a single determination—
whether an individual poses a risk of spreading a disease to warrant quar-
antine—is in reality multiple steps that involve the participation and deci-
sions of numerous people. Thus, “the apparently simple and
straightforward is really complex and convoluted.”260 These regulations
ignore the fact that the longer the chain of steps and the more intercon-
nectedness and interdependence of those steps, the more complex imple-
mentation becomes. And the more complex the implementation, the
more opportunities for error. If quarantine is viewed as the CDC’s major
weapon against an epidemic, the regulations’ complexity and lack of nec-
essary protections make it likely to fail.
A relevant question then is, what actions should be taken by the fed-
eral government, and the CDC, that may be more effective than overly
strict quarantine measures? Both national and international organizations
recognize that a resilient population is more likely to withstand a poten-
tial epidemic.261 Populations with good nutrition, high literacy rates, ade-
quate income, and access to appropriate medical care, social services, and
257. U.S. ex rel. Siegel v. Shinnick, 219 F. Supp. 789, 791 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); Speaker v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Ctrs. For Disease Control & Prevention, 680 F.
Supp. 2d 1359, 1360–61 (N.D. Ga. 2009).
258. JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: HOW GREAT
EXPECTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND; OR, WHY IT’S AMAZING
THAT FEDERAL PROGRAMS WORK AT ALL, THIS BEING A SAGA OF THE ECONOMIC DE-
VELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION AS TOLD BY TWO SYMPATHETIC OBSERVERS WHO SEEK TO
BUILD MORALS ON A FOUNDATION OF RUINED HOPES 147 (3d ed. 1984).
259. See id. (“The more directly the policy aims at its target, the fewer the decisions
involved in its ultimate realization and the greater the likelihood it will be implemented.”).
While the authors caution that simplicity in itself is not the goal, “[s]implicity can be ig-
nored, however, only at the peril of breakdown.” Id.
260. Id. at 93.
261. See Margaret E. Kruk et al., What Is a Resilient Health System? Lessons from
Ebola, 385 Lancet 1910, 1910 (2015) (arguing the need for resilience to prevent and re-
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sources of reliable information are better prepared to understand the
meaning of an outbreak and what to do in response. They are better able
to act responsibly than populations lacking some or all of these attributes.
For example, a well-educated population is likely to understand how to
avoid exposure to an infectious agent and, if exposed or infected, how to
avoid transmitting infection to others.
Several federal statutes give HHS authority to issue regulations that
help develop a resilient population.262 The Act authorizes the Secretary
to “assist States and their political subdivisions in the prevention and sup-
pression of communicable diseases and with respect to other public
health matters . . . and shall advise the several States on matters relating
to the preservation and improvement of the public health.”263 For exam-
ple, HHS can establish vaccination clinics to offer vaccines to the pub-
lic264 and track influenza vaccine distribution.265 The Secretary may
provide technical assistance concerning sexually transmitted diseases.266
The Secretary also “may take such action as may be appropriate to re-
spond to the public health emergency [disease or disorder], including
making grants, providing awards for expenses, and entering into contracts
and conducting and supporting investigations into the cause, treatment,
or prevention of a disease or disorder.”267
The CDC, acting for the Secretary, can and does make grants and assist
the states and other entities to prevent or control tuberculosis, including
through public education.268 The CDC can also establish fellowship and
training programs in disease prevention.269 The CDC can collect data and
report on diabetes,270 asthma,271 pregnancy complications,272 prenatal
and postnatal health,273 maternal depression,274 oral health and fluorida-
tion,275 hepatitis C,276 human papillomavirus,277 muscular dystrophy,278
spond to epidemics). See generally Judith Rodin, The Resilience Dividend: Being Strong in
a World Where Things Go Wrong (2014).
262. See generally Public Health Service, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Ch. 6A, especially
§§ 215 and 311; 42 U.S.C. §§ 216, 243, and 361–69 (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 264–72 (2012); 31
U.S.C. § 9701 (2012).
263. 42 U.S.C. § 243.
264. 42 C.F.R. § 70.9 (2017).
265. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-1.
266. Id. § 247c.
267. Id. § 247d. For example, the Public Health Service provided temporary relocation
assistance to residents who lived near Love Canal because of the emergency. Emergency
Authority of the Secretary of Health and Human Services Under 42 U.S.C. § 243(c)(2), 4B
Op. O.L.C. 638 (1980).
268. 42 U.S.C. § 247b-6.
269. Id. § 247b-8.
270. Id. §§ 247b-9, 247b-9a.
271. Id. § 247b-10.
272. Id. § 247b-12.
273. Id. § 247b-13.
274. Id. § 247b-13a.
275. Id. § 247b-14.
276. Id. § 247b-15.
277. Id. § 247b-17.
278. Id. § 247b-18.
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and mosquito-borne diseases.279
The Secretary of HHS is authorized to conduct or cooperate in re-
search “relating to the causes, diagnosis, treatment, control, and preven-
tion of physical and mental diseases and impairments of man, including
water purification, sewage treatment, and pollution of lakes and
streams.”280 This type of research can yield recommendations for policies
and programs that enable populations to resist or respond to disease
outbreaks.281
Of particular relevance to preventing contagious disease is the first
subsection of the statute that also authorizes federal quarantine. Subsec-
tion (a) of § 264 offers HHS far more discretion to issue regulations pro-
viding for ways other than quarantine to prevent disease. The
authorization to “make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment
are necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of com-
municable diseases” is an express congressional authorization of broad
rule-making authority with respect to communicable diseases—not lim-
ited to quarantinable diseases.282 The statute provides examples of the
measures contemplated. Such regulations “may provide for such inspec-
tion, fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, pest extermination, destruction
of animals or articles found to be so infected or contaminated as to be
sources of dangerous infection to human beings, and other measures, as
in his judgment may be necessary.”283 The examples listed suggest that
limiting the liberty of individuals is not within the scope of subsection (a);
that subject is covered in subsections (c) and (d) concerning foreign and
domestic quarantine. Nevertheless, there is plenty of room for positive
measures to prevent the communicable diseases from entering the coun-
try and spreading across state lines.284
279. Id. § 247b-21.
280. Id. § 241.
281. Certain types of studies are specifically delegated to agencies within HHS. For
example, research concerning health statistics, health services, and health care technology
is delegated primarily to the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and the Na-
tional Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). Id. § 242b. NCHS is also responsible for con-
ducting epidemiological studies and reporting on the incidence and prevalence of diseases
and their relationship to various causes, including the physical and behavioral determinants
of health. Id. § 242k.
282. Id. § 264(a).
283. Id. The full text reads as follows:
§ 264. Regulations to control communicable diseases
(a)Promulgation and enforcement by Surgeon General
The Surgeon General, with the approval of the Secretary, is authorized to
make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to pre-
vent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases
from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or
possession into any other State or possession. For purposes of carrying out
and enforcing such regulations, the Surgeon General may provide for such
inspection, fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, pest extermination, de-
struction of animals or articles found to be so infected or contaminated as
to be sources of dangerous infection to human beings, and other measures,
as in his judgment may be necessary.
284. See generally Mariner, Annas, & Parmet, supra note 28, at 379–80.
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Here, several questions arise. First, how much authority does the fed-
eral government have over preventing the introduction and spread of
communicable diseases? How much of this authority should the federal
government exercise, and how much should be left to the states? And
finally, how much federal authority should Congress delegate to adminis-
trative agencies?
While the Constitution makes no mention of communicable diseases,
there is little doubt that Congress’s Article I powers to regulate foreign
and interstate commerce, to establish rules of naturalization, to support
Armies, and to maintain Navies give it rather broad authority to prevent
the introduction and spread of contagious diseases that would interfere
with commerce, the national defense, or military capacity. Thus, identifi-
cation of contagious diseases entering at the nation’s borders is not only
within the scope of federal authority, but also properly allocated to Con-
gress as a matter of sensible policy. Moreover, the statutes mentioned
above delegate substantial authority to the HHS to formulate positive
measures to provide information and support to the population. This del-
egation of authority is far less likely to be challenged than the more spe-
cific federal quarantine statute.
Cass Sunstein argues that, in practice, United States courts use a
slightly modified version of the nondelegation doctrine, to wit, “Executive
agencies cannot make certain kinds of decisions unless Congress has ex-
plicitly authorized them to do so.”285 To determine what kinds of deci-
sions are outside agency discretion, he suggests several nondelegation
canons drawn from canons of statutory interpretation.286 Of particular
relevance here is one canon that Sunstein does not focus on: the “Avoid-
ance Canon.”287 It counsels that ambiguous statutes should be construed
285. Cass R. Sunstein, The American Nondelegation Doctrine 2 (Working Paper, May
22, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2972935 [https://perma.cc/7QK4-249E] (emphasis
added).
286. Id. at 3–5. These canons are: statutes in derogation of the common law should be
narrowly construed; statutory ambiguities should be construed to avoid possible constitu-
tional violations; absent an express statutory prohibition, statutes should be interpreted to
allow agencies to consider the costs of regulation; and ambiguous statutes should not be
construed so as to answer “major questions”—answers that “would bring about an enor-
mous and transformative expansion in regulatory authority without clear congressional au-
thorization.” Id. at 4–5 (citing Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444
(2014)) (internal quotations and alteration omitted).
287. See id. at 4. The Major Question canon may also be relevant. This argues that
regulatory authority over “a significant portion of the American economy” or making deci-
sions of “economic and political significance” requires congressional authorization. FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000); see also Util. Air Regu-
latory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014); Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum
Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 709, 712 (1980). But see King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015);
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516–17 (2007). This is distinct from deference to
agency interpretation of its own as discussed in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984), which applies when Congress has not spoken to
an issue or where there is a gap in the statute that the statute authorizes the agency to fill in
or complete, although both issues may arise in the same case.
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to avoid conflicting with provisions of the Constitution.288 It makes sense
that an agency should not take it upon itself to make a rule that could
violate a constitutional right unless Congress has expressly authorized it
to do so.289 Regulations that make it possible for people to protect them-
selves against contagious diseases, however, should not raise any constitu-
tional questions. These include providing people who are asked to enter
into voluntary quarantine with the resources they need to remain com-
fortable and the income they need to survive. If people understand that
they will not be penalized for cooperating with public health recommen-
dations, they are more likely to volunteer. Moreover, with government
providing financial and material support, the public is more likely to con-
sider these volunteers to be generous citizens acting in the public interest,
rather than potential disease vectors.
Another approach that would improve public trust and public under-
standing of governmental action, and reduce unnecessary quarantines,
would be to truly increase transparency. Rather than simply promulgate
regulations that purportedly “codify current practices,”290 the CDC
should take steps to collect and share data on quarantine usage nation-
ally. The Ebola scare led to an unacceptable amount of quarantines that
wasted resources and did nothing to improve public health. In fact, they
continue to waste resources through legal disputes that are working their
way through the court system.291 Yet we have no definitive knowledge of
how many quarantines or isolation orders, be they voluntary or involun-
tary, were issued in each state. One study attempted to collect this data
from the states that issued stringent quarantine orders for Ebola, and
concluded that “secrecy is pervasive.”292 Even freedom of information
requests have been met with resistance.293
288. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 405–06, 423, 427 (2010) (discussing the
canon of constitutional avoidance, which counsels against an interpretation that would vio-
late the Constitution). See generally Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 355, 359 (2012); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpreta-
tion: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750,
1761–68 (2010).
289. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 122–23, 130 (1958) (striking down the Secre-
tary’s regulation generally barring passports to Communist Party members as beyond the
Secretary’s authority, despite very broad authorization to make “such rules as the Presi-
dent shall designate and prescribe”). But see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1965) (up-
holding broad federal authority to restrict travel).
290. Quarantine Regulations, supra note 12, at 6923.
291. Though the lawsuit against Connecticut Governor Malloy was dismissed by the
District Court, it has been appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Brief for
Robert M Palumbos et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of
Conn. v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv-00201, 2017 WL 4897048, at *4 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2017).
292. ACLU & GHJP, supra note 19, at 27. Surveys were submitted to the Departments
of Health of all fifty states and only six states responded. There was also some question as
to the accuracy of those who did report. For example, Connecticut responded that they had
quarantined nine individuals, yet, the authors discovered at least one other person not
included who was “unofficially” quarantined in a hotel room for two days. See ACLU &
GHJP, supra note 19.
293. ACLU & GHJP, supra note 19, at 28.
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The CDC published a report noting that state, local, and territorial
health departments, and not the CDC itself, “monitored” 29,789 people
during the Ebola scare, but did not report whether monitoring was war-
ranted, whether the agency issued any federal orders to do so, or how
many people voluntarily complied with the recommendations.294 The re-
port did state that 97% of those monitored were “travelers at low risk” of
Ebola infection.295 Among those characterized as low-risk or some-risk,
796 had some symptoms, but only 104 (13%) of these were tested for
Ebola.296 None tested positive.297
The manner and breadth at which government officials confine individ-
uals should be transparent. If this is truly a goal of the CDC, they should
work diligently with local, state, and federal officials to gather accurate
data and share them publicly. These data should include not only official
quarantine and isolation orders but also any order of restricted move-
ment whether it be involuntary or “voluntary.” Far too often during the
Ebola scare individuals were coerced into accepting “voluntary” quaran-
tines, likely because the agency had no grounds to justify an order for
involuntary quarantine.298 A study conducted after the Ebola scare had
ceased concluded that at least forty formal quarantine orders were imple-
mented; however, 233 more de facto quarantines were put into place
under pressure from officials.299
Though the focus of this article has been on the quarantine regulations
and, thus, official quarantines, these “voluntary” orders are particularly
concerning. If individuals lack protection from violations of their rights
and from direct and indirect harm when subject to a formal federal quar-
antine order, they are even less protected when pressured to stay home
under threat of sanctions without a formal order. Increased transparency
about the number of both voluntary and involuntary quarantines and iso-
lations is necessary to determine the incidence and prevalence of these
measures. Data tracking would enable more informed analysis of whether
these measures are used according to constitutional standards. Moreover,
such data could be used to determine what resources individuals need in
order to enable truly voluntary cooperation with public health recom-
294. Hyacinte Julien Kabore et al., Monitoring of Persons with Risk for Exposure to
Ebola Virus—United States, November 3, 2014-December 27, 2015, 65 Morbidity & Mortal-
ity Wkly Rep. 1401, 1401 (2016). The use of “voluntary” quarantines is more troubling
because of the inability to ensure due process protections for those individuals. Ulrich,
supra note 11, at 268.
295. Hyacinte, supra note 294, at 1401.
296. Hyacinte, supra note 294, at 1403.
297. Hyacinte, supra note 294, at 1403. The report characterizes this monitoring as a
success, because so many agencies cooperated to carry out the monitoring of so many
people. It attributes some of this success to the use of local police departments and federal
Department of Homeland Security centers in the states. It does not report the cost of this
monitoring. Hyacinte, supra note 294, at 1403.
298. ACLU & GHJP, supra note 19, at 26–27. Even Kaci Hickox’s home stay in Maine
started as “voluntary.” Id.
299. ACLU & GHJP, supra note 19, at 29. There is also information in the report re-
garding de facto quarantines that stemmed from community pressure.
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mendations. A rights-based approach that encouraged the public to seek
medical attention and incentivize true voluntary measures would mini-
mize the need for coercive pressure from public health officials. If the
CDC in fact seeks to keep the public informed and aware of “current
practices,” tracking and sharing data on movement restrictions would be
a better mechanism for accomplishing this goal.
V. CONCLUSION
We will always need to protect ourselves from contagious diseases.
How we do so is important for both practical and normative reasons. In
practice, quarantining a population has never stopped an epidemic. Invol-
untary quarantine or isolation of an individual is necessary only in rare
instances and is certainly not enough to control the spread of disease. If
quarantine is our primary tool for disease control, we will not be pre-
pared for the next epidemic.
The measures we choose to predict, prevent, or respond to outbreaks
of contagious diseases can sustain or undermine the rule of law. Laws that
grant officials broad discretion to impose coercive measures based on
questionable standards and with little accountability weaken our constitu-
tional protections against arbitrary punishment. They also encourage
skepticism of the need for—and fairness of—official actions, which in
turn erodes willingness to cooperate with sensible official recommenda-
tions and exacerbates public health emergencies.
There is no need to dilute the principles governing quarantine and iso-
lation in order to protect public health. There are positive alternatives
that harness the public’s natural preference for self-protection. These in-
clude laws creating and financing public and private programs that enable
people to stay home without penalty—retaining their employment or in-
come and access to necessary food, water, smart phones, vaccines,
medicines, and other necessities. People who feel respected are more
likely to be willing to cooperate voluntarily with sensible restraints on
their movements than people who are treated like criminals.
The federal government can implement and expand positive measures
like these, as it has in some other areas. HHS and CDC can provide the
expertise needed by states, localities, Indian Nations, and the entire pop-
ulation to protect themselves without the use of force. The CDC in partic-
ular should stay focused on the science underpinning its
recommendations and actions, including recognizing and explaining un-
certainty where it exists. Federal quarantine authority should be exer-
cised only at the border and only in the extraordinary circumstances of
the threat of a quarantinable disease. The authority to involuntarily quar-
antine individuals who have not been determined to have a contagious
disease and are already inside the country should remain with the states.
